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INTRODUCTION
In June 20o8, the Council of State of France upheld an administrative deci-
sion denying French citizenship to a Moroccan national, Faiza Silmi, on the ba-
sis that she had not demonstrated "sufficient assimilation" to French values.!
Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University School of Law; University of
Michigan Law School, J.D. 1988; Harvard College, A.B. 1983. I would like to thank
the many Somalis of Lewiston, Maine who so generously shared their time and
stories with me. I am particularly grateful to Ismail Ahmed, without whom this
Article could not have been written. I am also grateful to Bates College professors
Patricia Buck and Heather Lindkvist, who offered me their own unique perspec-
tives and generously shared with me their scholarship. I thank Phil Nadeau, Dep-
uty City Administrator of Lewiston, for offering the government's perspective and
Portland attorney Marcus Jaynes for putting me in touch with Somali exiles in
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News reports indicated that Silmi was denied citizenship because she wore the
niqab, an Islamic veil that covered her from head to toe, revealing only her
eyes.' The decision of the Council of State emphasized that the denial was based
not only on her attire but also on the fact that she had adopted a "radical" ver-
sion of Islam "incompatible with essential values of the French community,
particularly the principle of equality of the sexes."3 Fadela Amara, the French
Minister of Urban Affairs, who is a practicing Muslim of Algerian descent, sup-
ported the decision. She described the niqab as a "prison" and "strait jacket." 4
Amara stated publicly that "[i]t is not a religious insignia but the insignia of a
totalitarian political project that promotes inequality between the sexes and is
totally lacking in democracy."5
According to a French administrative agency report, Silmi's interview with
social services revealed that she "lived in total submission to her male relatives"
and that "the idea of challenging it has never crossed her mind."6 In an inter-
view with the New York Times, Silmi explained that she had chosen to wear the
niqab upon coming to France rather than the traditional djelaba-a long, flow-
ing garment with a headscarf which she had worn in Morocco-because the
djelaba was not modest enough and she did not want to "draw men's looks."7
New York and Minnesota. I would also like to thank my research assistants, Mor-
gan Hall, Yara Lorenzo, Abigail Atkinson, and Sarah Robinson-Campbell. I am
grateful to my colleague, John Kang, and to David Abraham, Gerald Neuman, and
Ayelet Shachar, who offered invaluable feedback on earlier drafts. I thank the edi-
tors of this Article for their thoughtful comments on refining the piece, particu-
larly Joshua Geltzer, Noorain Khan, and Rachel Serlen, and my Articles Editor
from the Yale Law & Policy Review, Jaclyn Link. Finally, I owe a debt of gratitude
to our faculty services librarian, Katie Brown, a native of Maine, for her assistance.
1. Conseil d'Etat [CE] [highest administrative court], June 27, 2oo8, No. 286798, Sec-
tion du contentieux, http://www.conseil-etat.fr/ce/urispd/index.ac-ldo82o.shtml
(last visited Apr. 23, 2009)[hereinafter Council of State Decision].
2. See, e.g., Katrin Bennhold, A Veil Closes France's Door to Citizenship, N.Y. TIMEs,
July 19, 20o8, at Al.
3. Council of State Decision, supra note 1, 5 13.
4. See Bennhold, supra note 2.
5. Id.
6. Conclusions du Mine. Prada Bordenave, Commissaire du Gouvernement, No.
286798, May 26, 20o8, at 4, available at http://www.conseil-etat.fr/ce/jurispd/
conclusions/conclusions_286798.pdf [hereinafter Conclusions du Mine. Prada Bor-
denave].
7. Bennhold, supra note 2; see also HOLY QUR'AN 24:31 (M.H. Shakir trans., 1983)
[hereinafter HOLY QUR'AN] (advising believing women to "cast down their looks
and guard their private parts" and to "wear their head-coverings over their bos-
oms, and not display their ornaments except to their husbands or their fathers, or
the fathers of their husbands, or their sons").
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She also had told French officials that she was not interested in exercising her
political rights, since only men should be allowed to vote.'
The Council of State decision highlights a modern reality. Throughout the
Western world, women's bodies serve as one of the battlegrounds for struggles
over competing perspectives on citizenship, belonging, and the proper place of
religion within a secular state.9 In many Western states, women play an impor-
tant symbolic role as keepers of their culture, particularly in traditional or fun-
damentalist communities." It is not unusual for immigrants or refugees living
in Western societies to adopt a stricter set of beliefs and practices than they had
practiced in their home countries as a way of insulating members of their
community from what they see as the negative effects of Westernization and as-
similation, including crime, drugs, and declining moral values. Although many
women and girls gladly embrace these norms, others choose conformity as the
path of least resistance, while still others refuse to comply and either face social
8. Posting of Thomas Kleine Brockhoff to PostGlobal, http://newsweek
.washingtonpost.com/postglobal/thomaskleinebrockhoff/2oo8/o7/democracy-and
a_pieceofcloth.html (July 18, 2oo8, 11:55 EST) [hereinafter Posting of Kleine
Brockhoffl.
9. Jack Straw, the former leader of the British House of Commons, criticized the use
of the veil by Muslim women for making Muslims' integration into British society
more difficult. See MIGRATION POL. INST., Top 10 MIGRATION ISSUES OF 2006, at
5 (2oo6) [hereinafter Top 1O MIGRATION ISSUES], available at http://www
.migrationinformation.ord/pdf/MIS-ToploMigrationIssues2oo6.pdf, see also Kirk
Johnson, Separated from Children, Sect Mothers Share Tears, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16,
20o8, at A15 (discussing the impact of a raid on polygamist Mormon compound
on the mothers of the children seized).
10. See AYELET SHACHAR, MULTICULTURAL JURISDICTIONS: CULTURAL DIFFERENCES
AND WOMEN'S RIGHTS 55-56 (2OO1); see also Ayelet Shachar, Religion, State, and
the Problem of Gender: New Modes of Citizenship and Governance in Diverse Socie-
ties 50 McGILL L.J. 49 (2005). Here, "fundamentalism" refers to a Western term
that connotes the literal divinity of the religious text. The term can be traced back
to approximately 191o when certain Protestant churches in the United States pub-
lished a series called "The Fundamentals," in which these churches indicated their
dissent from mainstream Protestantism and embraced a more literal interpreta-
tion of the Bible. To use the term "Islamic fundamentalists" to describe radical
Muslim extremists is thus misleading and inaccurate, since the belief in the divin-
ity and inerrancy of the Qur'an is a basic tenet of Islam. See BERNARD LEWIS &
BUNTZIE ELLIS CHURCHILL, ISLAM: THE RELIGION AND THE PEOPLE 161-62 (2009).
11. See SHACHAR, supra note io, at 35-36; see also Kelley Bouchard, A Thousand Miles,
ME. SUNDAY TELEGRAM (Portland, Me.), June 30, 2002, at LA [hereinafter Bou-
chard, A Thousand Miles] (describing the perception that a tight-knit immigrant
community will help the members of the community maintain their Muslim faith
and Somali culture and "avoid the less attractive aspects of American culture [in-
cluding] premarital sex, drug use, drinking, divorce and a lack of regard for family
ties").
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ostracism or prepare an exit strategy." The Council of State decision also raises
an equally troubling question: To what extent is conformity to community
norms at the group level treated as failure to assimilate at the national or local
level?
This Article explores how some of these issues have unfolded in one com-
munity in the United States, the Lewiston/Auburn (L/A) area of south central
Maine, which has become home to over 3000 Somali refugees. In February
2001, Somali refugees who had resettled in major urban areas began a secondary
migration to Lewiston after Somali elders sent scouts across America in search
of a home where they could raise their children and practice Islam in relative
peace. 13 After the first group settled in Lewiston in early 2001, Somalis arrived in
increasing numbers,14 overwhelming the city's social services and resulting in
the election of a new mayor, Larry Raymond, who ran and won on an anti-
Somali platform. 5 Soon after assuming office, Raymond issued an open letter to
the Somali community, telling local Somalis to advise their friends and relatives
to stop coming to Lewiston because the city was "maxed out financially, physi-
cally and emotionally."' 6 This incident drew the ire of Somalis while also spark-
ing the interest of a white supremacist group from Ohio that organized a hate
rally in the city of Lewiston on a cold winter morning in January 2003.'7 That
12. See SHACHAR, supra note lo, at 66; Interview with Ismail Ahmed, Consultant,
Support, Training Technical Assistance and Resources, in Lewiston, Me. (July 1,
2008) [hereinafter Interview with Ismail Ahmed) (on file with the Yale Law & Pol-
icy Review); Interview with Heather Lindkvist, Lecturer, Bates College, in Lewis-
ton, Me. (Aug. 5, 2008) [hereinafter Interview with Heather Lindkvist] (on file
with the Yale Law & Policy Review); Interview with E.V. in Auburn, Me. (Aug. 5,
20o8) [hereinafter Interview with E.V.] (on file with author); Interview with A.Z.,
B.Y., and C.X. in Portland, Me. (Aug. 4, 20o8) [hereinafter Interview with A.Z.,
B.Y., and C.X.] (on file with author).
13. Bouchard, A Thousand Miles, supra note 11; see also William Finnegan, Letter from
Maine: New in Town, NEW YORKER, Dec. 11, 2006, at 46-58.
14. See PHIL NADEAU, CITY OF LEWISTON REPORT TO MAINE'S CONGRESSIONAL
DELEGATION: FEDERAL FUNDING DEFICIENCIES FOR REFUGEE AND SECONDARY
MIGRANT SERVICES AND PROGRAMMING 13 (2007).
15. See THE LETTER (Arab Film Distribution 2003); see also Pam Belluck, Mixed Wel-
come as Somalis Settle in Maine City, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2002, at A16; Roger
Moore, Racism Is Clear But Much More Isn't, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Apr. 1, 2005, at
11.
16. H.D.S. Greenway, Op-Ed., Standing Up to Prejudice, BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 1, 2006,
at A13.
17. See Vaishali Mamgain & Karen Collins, Off the Boat, Now Off to Work: Refugees in
the Labour Market in Portland, Maine, 16 J. REFUGEE STUD. 113, 114 (2003); Kelley
Bouchard, Gregory D. Kesich & Josie Huang, Two Worlds Collide in Lewiston, ME.
SUNDAY TELEGRAM (Portland, Me.), Jan. 12, 2003, at 1A [hereinafter Bouchard et
al., Two Worlds Collide] ("Despite temperatures in the low 20s, 450 anti-racism
protesters and racist sympathizers gathered outside the racist meeting.").
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same day, a peace rally in support of the Somalis was held at Bates College in
Lewiston, which approximately 4500 attended, including the governor, the at-
torney general and Maine's congressional delegation."
Since then, the State of Maine and the neighboring towns of Lewiston and
Auburn have struggled to meet the needs of the Somali refugees for social ser-
vices, English classes, and job training while dealing with the social unrest their
presence has created in this overwhelmingly white, insular, Roman Catholic
community.'9 In addition, government officials continue to face the challenge
of defining to what extent they can accommodate the religious and cultural dif-
ferences of the Somali community without infringing on the rights of Somali
women or low-caste and minority clans.2 °
By focusing on one case study, this Article attempts both to evaluate the
merits and explore the consequences of different approaches to immigrant inte-
gration. It examines the impact that national citizenship norms and state and
local integration policies have had on the Somalis' experience in Lewiston while
also exploring internal obstacles to the Somalis' incorporation. Part I briefly re-
views competing theoretical perspectives on citizenship, membership, and be-
longing. This Part explores the historic tension between a more liberal or plural-
ist view of citizenship, where loyalty to the "American Creed" is viewed as
compatible with religious and cultural differences,2 and a more nationalist, An-
glo-centric, "core culture" model, rooted in Christianity and the English com-
mon law that tends to characterize immigrants who do not share our national
and cultural values as a potentially destabilizing force. Under yet a third
model, multicultural accommodation, which has gained acceptance in Canada
and is increasingly gaining adherents in the United States, ethnic groups living
in cultural enclaves enjoy a certain degree of autonomy over their community's
internal affairs. 3 This Article will explore throughout whether multicultural ac-
18. Bouchard et al., Two Worlds Collide, supra note 17. These events are also power-
fully captured in the documentary THE LETTER, supra note 15.
19. See generally Phil Nadeau, The Somalis of Lewiston: Effects of Rapid Immigration to
a Homogeneous Maine City, S. ME. REV., Apr. 2005, at 102 [hereinafter Nadeau,
The Somalis of Lewiston] (describing the impact of Somali immigration on a
community in Maine).
20. See, e.g., Heather Lindkvist, The Reach and Limits of Cultural Accommodation:
Public Schools and Somali Muslim Immigrants in Maine, in JusT SCHOOLS: PURSU-
ING EQUALITY IN SOCIETIES OF DIFFERENCE 164 (Martha Minow, Richard
Schweder & Hazel Rose Marcus eds., 2008) [hereinafter JUST SCHOOLS].
21. See, e.g., Stanley Hoffmann, More Perfect Union: Nation and Nationalism in Amer-
ica, HARV. INT'L REV., Winter 1997/1998, at 72.
22. Id.; see also SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, WHO ARE WE? THE CHALLENGES TO AMER-
ICA'S NATIONAL IDENTITY 59-62 (2004); DAVID MILLER, ON NATIONALITY 119-54
(1995).
23. WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL ODYSSEYS: NAVIGATING THE NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL POLITICS OF DIVERSITY 51, 71-72 (2007).
339
YALE LAW & POLICY REVIEW
commodation can coexist with liberal and core culture approaches to immi-
grant integration.
Part II examines how these different theories of membership and belonging
are reflected in the naturalization case law on good moral character. Through
most of the twentieth century, and notwithstanding the U.S. Constitution's
grant of power to Congress to establish a uniform rule for naturalization,14 the
U.S. Immigration Service and many district court judges applied a community-
based standard in assessing whether applicants met the good moral character
requirement for U.S. citizenship.25 Much of the case law involved naturalization
applicants accused of violating state mores legislation, including laws against
adultery, fornication, homosexuality, bigamy, abandonment, and incest. 6 In
1981, however, a Fourth Circuit decision led to an important shift in the law.
7
The court found that reliance on state sodomy laws as a basis for denying natu-
ralization would defeat the Constitution's uniformity requirement and adopted
a federal standard for evaluating good moral character based on whether the
conduct in question was "harmful to the public." "s In 199o, Congress trans-
ferred authority to decide naturalization petitions from the federal district
courts to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).2 9 Yet, prior to this,
a rich body of case law emerged that explicitly draws on ecclesiastic, common
24. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
25. Regulations provide that the naturalization examiner "shall evaluate claims of
good moral character on a case-by-case basis taking into account the elements
enumerated in this section and the standards of the average citizen in the com-
munity of residence." 8 C.F.R. § 316.1o(a)(2) (2006). For an overview of much of
the case law, see Michael T. Hertz, Comment, State Adultery Law and the "Good
Moral Character" Naturalization Requirement, 7 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 294, 296
(1969); Steven L. Strange, Note, Private Consensual Sexual Conduct and the "Good
Moral Character" Requirement of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 14 COLUM.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 357, 362 (1975).
26. See generally V. Woerner, Annotation, What Constitutes Showing of "Good Moral
Character" on the Part of an Applicant for Naturalization, 22 A.L.R. 2d 244, §§ 10-13
(1952).
27. Nemetz v. INS, 647 F.2d 432 ( 4th Cir. 1981).
28. Id. at 436. Soon after, the INS amended its own test to adopt the Court's approach
in Nemetz. See Naturalization Requirements, INS Interp. Ltr. 316.1, § 316.1(0(7) (as
amended) [hereinafter INS Interp. Letter] (stating that private homosexual acts
with consenting adults are not, alone, facts barring the applicant from meeting the
good moral character standards where said acts are not considered criminal activ-
ity under the jurisdiction in which they took place); see also D.L. Hawley, Good
Moral Characterfor Naturalization, 3-02 IMMIGRATION BRIEFINGS 1 (2002).
29. Immigration Act of 199o, Pub. L. No. ll-649, 104 Stat. 4978 (199o) (codified at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1446-1447 (2006)). District court judges, by statute, still have the power
of de novo review in revisiting denials by the Naturalization Unit. Immigration
and Nationality Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (codified as amended
at 8 U.S.C. § 1447(b) (2006)).
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law, and philosophical sources, as well as the community's moral values of the
time." These earlier cases are more than just a reflection of a bygone era; they
implicate the broader debate over whether state mores regulation is still appro-
priate" and raise the question whether an applicant's eligibility for naturaliza-
tion should turn on the values of the particular community where he or she re-
sides.
Through a close study of the Somalis' experience in Lewiston, Part III of
this Article explores the impact of external and intragroup barriers on the proc-
ess of incorporating an immigrant or refugee group into the social fabric of a
community. It first investigates the factors that led a large segment of the So-
mali refugee community resettled by the U.S. government in major urban cities
across America to relocate to Lewiston, Maine. It then examines the initial re-
ception of the Somali refugees by the people of Lewiston and the circumstances
that led to a series of crises within the town. This Part then analyzes continuing
barriers to the Somalis' incorporation. It first addresses external barriers at the
federal, state, and local levels before addressing intragroup barriers, including
isolationist tendencies within the Somali community, ongoing rivalries among
the major clans and subclans, the subordination of women, and discrimination
against minority and low-caste clans. The Article concludes in Part IV by exam-
ining the barriers to citizenship and immigrant integration that are created by
the interplay among national citizenship norms, state, and local integration
policies, and the norms and dynamics internal to immigrant communities
themselves.
This Article is the result of two summers of ethnographic research in the
town of Lewiston and the neighboring town of Auburn. In 2007 and 20o8, I
held a series of meetings and interviews in Lewiston and Auburn. My initial re-
search in 2007 consisted largely of interviews with staff at the major social ser-
vice providers, including Catholic Charities Maine, the Lewiston Adult Educa-
tion Adult Learning Center (LAE), and the Immigrant Legal Assistance Project
(ILAP). In addition to meeting with program directors and caseworkers, I tu-
tored Somali Bantus at the LAE and conducted bi-monthly immigration intakes
for ILAP in Lewiston.3 2 I also coordinated a naturalization workshop co-hosted
by Catholic Charities, ILAP, and LAE to assess Somalis' eligibility for naturali-
zation before a substantial fee increase on July 30, 2007.31
30. See, e.g., Schmidt v. United States, 177 F.2d 450, 452 (2d Cir. 1949); Petition of
Smith, 71 F. Supp. 968 (D.N.J. 1947).
31. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
32. E-mail from Beth Stickney, Executive Director, Immigrant Legal Advocacy Pro-
ject, to Lauren Gilbert, Assoc. Professor of Law, St. Thomas Univ. (July 24, 2007,
8:26:55 EST) (on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review).
33. E-mail from Judith Southworth, Elder Refugee Outreach Coordinator, Catholic
Charities Me., to Lauren Gilbert, Assoc. Professor of Law, St. Thomas Univ. (July
19, 2007, 11:00:47 EST) [hereinafter E-mail from Judith Southworth] (on file with
the Yale Law & Policy Review); see also Adjustment of the Immigration and Natu-
ralization Benefit Application and Petition Fee Schedule, 72 Fed. Reg. 29,851,
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The following summer, with greater awareness of the structural impedi-
ments to naturalization, I shifted my focus to examine not only external but
also, perhaps more importantly, intragroup obstacles to naturalization and in-
tegration. Using a set of questions I had developed to help participants identify
and assess barriers to naturalization and integration, I conducted a series of
conversations with members of the Somali community as well as with Lewiston
government officials and area academics. After explaining my research objec-
tives, I then asked each Somali participant whether he or she would characterize
becoming a U.S. citizen or integrating into the social fabric of Lewiston as a per-
sonal goal or a goal of members of the Somali community. I asked participants
to identify the reasons why Somalis who chose to naturalize did so. If becoming
a U.S. citizen or integrating into Lewiston's social fabric was not identified as a
goal, I asked participants to define what their actual goals were. I then asked
participants to identify and assess particular obstacles to incorporation.
The Somalis with whom I met ranged in age from children and teenagers to
the elderly, from recent arrivals to persons who had come during the 198os be-
fore the collapse of the Somali state, from the preliterate to persons with ad-
vanced degrees. Of the Somalis with whom I spoke, 58% were female and 42%
were male. They ranged in age from five to seventy-four years old. While most
of the women were in their teens or early to mid-twenties, most of the males
ranged in age from their late thirties to their early fifties, due, perhaps, to the
traditional role of Somali men as the family's representative in the outside
world.3 4 All the Somalis with whom I met had been born in Somalia or in Ken-
yan refugee camps. All had obtained some form of legal status: 23% were natu-
ralized U.S. citizens, while 69% were refugees, and 8% were either asylees or asy-
lum seekers.
Most in-depth interviews occurred with individuals considered leaders of
different segments of the Somali community, including a former elder who left
Lewiston to move to Minneapolis, caseworkers at Catholic Charities active in
the local mosque, a former cultural skills trainer at Catholic Charities who has
opened his own consulting business, a student activist, a leader of the Somali
Bantu community, and a women's rights activist. I also had the opportunity to
converse with other Somalis, including a group of recent high school graduates,
Somali Bantu students at the local adult education center, a Somali family of six
from a low-caste minority clan that I assisted in applying for asylum, and other
Somalis seeking immigration assistance through ILAP. Although specific con-
versations with the latter two groups remain confidential due to attorney client
privilege," these consultations were valuable in identifying impediments to citi-
29,854 (May 30, 2007) (setting final rule for the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) fee schedule and comparing old fees with proposed
fees and final fees).
34. See Natoschia Scruggs, Somalia, in INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON FAMILY
VIOLENCE AND ABUSE: A COGNITIVE ECOLOGICAL APPROACH 223, 230 (Kathleen
Malley-Morrison ed., 2004).
35. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6 (2007).
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zenship faced by members of the Somali community, particularly women, the
elderly, and the illiterate. With the exception of Ismail Ahmed, who agreed to
be identified, and Khadra Jama, who spoke publicly, I have used random initials
to identify my Somali sources that bear no relationship to their actual names.
For the most part, the persons with whom I spoke were open and engaged. I en-
countered less openness, however, from more traditional Somalis when explor-
ing internal obstacles to integration in Lewiston, particularly with respect to
clan and tribal differences, the treatment of low-caste and minority clans, and
the role and treatment of women within Somali society.
Western liberal democracies today are struggling to define the content of
citizenship norms and what the state's role should be with regard to the reli-
gious and cultural differences of its newest members. One issue highlighted by
the decision of the French Council of State is what, if any, relationship should
exist between laws regulating access to citizenship and policies for integrating
immigrants into the social fabric36 To what extent, if any, should the state serve
as the gatekeeper with respect to persons unwilling or unable to assimilate to
dominant community norms?37
By examining the Somali community in Lewiston at close range, this study
critically explores various theories of citizenship and reveals their limits. It also
reveals that national citizenship norms, state and local integration policies, and
norms and dynamics internal to immigrant groups themselves appear to share a
surprising commonality: They are all driven by community-based norms. Even
citizenship theory can be reduced to three competing visions of community: a
nationalist core-culture model, a liberal model based on tolerance and mutual
respect, and an accommodationist model allowing for the existence of semi-
autonomous immigrant enclaves alongside the dominant culture. The story of
the Somalis of Lewiston, Maine and their host society reveals these various
norms in play, but it also reveals the limits of a community-based approach.
Excessive reliance on community norms risks infringing on the rights of sub-
groups within that community.
I. COMPETING THEORIES OF IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION
The conviction that we are a nation of immigrants still influences much of
the debate on immigration. The mythological "melting pot," while subject to
scholarly criticism,"8 has demonstrated great resilience in the United States as
36. See Lauren Gilbert, National Identity and Immigration Policy in the U.S. and the
European Union, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 99, 130-32 (2007) [hereinafter Gilbert, Na-
tional Identity and Immigration Policy].
37. See David Abraham, Solidarity and Particularity: E Pluribus Unum? A Comment on
Claus Offe's Hagar Essay, "Political Liberalism, Group Rights, and the Politics of
Fear and Trust," 6 STUD. CULTURE, POLITY & IDENTITIES 147, 149-50 (2005).
38. See, e.g., RICHARD ALBA & VICTOR NEE, REMAKING THE AMERICAN MAINSTREAM:
ASSIMILATION AND CONTEMPORARY IMMIGRATION 35-59 (2003); Jennifer Lee &
Frank D. Bean, America's Changing Color Lines: Race/Ethnicity, Immigration and
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the dominant paradigm. 39 Under a "straight-line" convergence model, immi-
grant groups and the majority culture become more and more alike over time,
in terms of characteristics, norms, behaviors, and values. 4 Stanley Hoffmann
has observed that the United States's unique identity is the product of a "mate-
rial feature," its ethnic diversity, which results from immigration, and "an ideo-
logical feature," its "democratic Creed." 4' The principle of E pluribus unum
(Latin for "out of many, one"), displayed by the American Eagle on the Great
Seal of the United States, remains a foundational principle of our society, even
as we become increasingly diverse.42 Over twenty-five years ago, the Staff Report
of the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy concluded that
"[t] he genius of the American system has been that loyalty to the United States
is compatible with other ties of affection-regional, local, religious or ethnic." 43
This view of immigrant assimilation, however, has been challenged in re-
cent years, both in the United States and abroad. Conservatives have questioned
whether certain immigrant groups will ever assimilate, 44 while some progres-
sives have questioned whether absorption into the dominant culture should be
the goal.45 Some scholars of assimilation have adopted what might be described
as a more nationalist core culture model of assimilation. 46 Multicultural ac-
commodationists, in contrast, would advocate for a model which allows for the
peaceful coexistence of different cultures, religions, and values without them
Multiracial Identification, 30 ANN. REV. Soc. 221 (2004); Alejandro Portes & Min
Zhou, The New Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants, 530
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScI. 74 (1993).
39. ALBA & NEE, supra note 38, at 18-19; see also Gilbert, National Identity and Immi-
gration Policy, supra note 36, at 133.
40. Susan K. Brown & Frank D. Bean, Assimilation Models, Old & New: Explaining a
Long-Term Process (U.C. Irvine Ctr. for Research on Immigration, Population
& Pub. Policy, Paper No. 082306, 20o6), available at http://www
.migrationinformation.org/USfocus/display.cfm?ID=442.
41. Hoffmann, supra note 21, at 72.
42. President-Elect Barack Obama, in the closing words of his victory speech on No-
vember 4, 20o8, specifically referred to the principle when he said, "This is our
time ... to reclaim the American dream and reaffirm that fundamental truth that
out of many we are one...." After a Hard Campaign, Gracious Words for the
Journey Ahead, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at P5.
43. SELECT COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION & REFUGEE POLICY, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST, STAFF REPORT 123 (1981) [hereinafter SELECT
COMM'N STAFF REPORT].
44. Ashley Pettus, End of the Melting Pot? The New Wave of Immigrants Presents New
Challenges, HARV. MAG., May/June 2007, at 44, 44-48.
45. KYMLICKA, supra note 23, at 71-72.
46. See, e.g., HUNTINGTON, supra note 22, at 59.
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dissipating or fusing together.47 By focusing on the Somalis of Lewiston, this Ar-
ticle examines the utility of different models of integration and their conse-
quences for our own distinctly "American" conception of national identity.
In the 196os, Milton Gordon advanced a multidimensional concept of as-
similation. According to Gordon, the first stage of assimilation required "accul-
turation," which he defined as the minority group's adoption of the cultural
practices of the host culture.4 ' He defined the "core culture" of the United
States as being white, Anglo-Protestant, and middle class. 49 Moreover, accord-
ing to Gordon, acculturation was a one-way process, with the minority or im-
migrant group expected to adapt to the core culture, while the core culture re-
mained largely intact.5 0
Although scholars criticized Gordon's acculturation model as being Anglo-
conformist,5' in recent years, it has seen a revival in certain academic circles.
Professor Samuel Huntington argues that the United States has a core Anglo-
Protestant culture, which he claims is essential to its survival.5 2 According to
Huntington, the American identity is the product of a unique, Anglo-Protestant
culture, key facets of which include the English language, Christianity, and Eng-
lish concepts of the rule of law." Huntington claims that this Anglo-Protestant
culture is central to America's identity and that failure to recommit to it poses a
threat to America's survival.14 He also questions the capability of certain immi-
grant groups to assimilate.5
Similar to the core culture model, member states of the European Union
tended historically to share a philosophy of maintaining their national and cul-
47. See Rita SUssmuth & Werner Weidenfeld, The Integration Challenge: Living To-
gether in a Europe of Diversity, in MANAGING INTEGRATION: THE EUROPEAN UN-
ION'S RESPONSIBILITIES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS Xi, xi-XViii (Rita Suissmuth &
Werner Weidenfeld eds., 2005) [hereinafter MANAGING INTEGRATION].
48. MILTON GORDON, ASSIMILATION IN AMERICAN LIFE: THE ROLE OF RACE, RELIG-
ION, AND NATIONAL ORIGINS 70-71 (1964).
49. Id. at 72.
50. Id. at lO9-1o. In contrast, as discussed below, many Somalis who have settled in
Lewiston define "acculturation" somewhat differently; to them, it is the process of
deciding which Somali values to keep and which to discard, which American val-
ues to embrace and which to reject. Interview with D.W. in Lewiston, Me. (July
10, 2008) [hereinafter Interview with D.W.] (on file with author); Interview with
G.T. in Lewiston, Me. (July 23, 2008) [hereinafter Interview with G.T.] (on file
with author).
51. See Brown & Bean, supra note 40.
52. HUNTINGTON, supra note 22, at 19,336-40.
53. Id. at xv-xvi.
54. Id. at 2o; see also Gilbert, National Identity and Immigration Policy, supra note 36,
at 115.
55. HUNTINGTON, supra note 22, at 244-56.
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tural identities. s6 As the new millennium approached, the EU and Member
States recognized the need for fresh approaches to integrating immigrants, and
several EU states adopted distinctly multicultural models.5 7 In recent years,
however, as doubts regarding multicultural accommodation have grown,"8
many EU Member States have concluded that the best way to integrate legal
immigrants is extending to them the same rights and responsibilities as EU citi-
zens, while requiring that they learn the language and live by the laws and val-
ues of society. 9
Indeed, the decision of the French Council of State to deny citizenship to
Faiza Silmi on the basis that she subscribed to a "radical" version of Islam "in-
compatible with essential values of the French community" was only the latest
in a series of policy measures designed to ensure that immigrants adhere to
French laws, culture, and traditions. In 2003, the French government adopted a
policy requiring new immigrants to sign an "integration contract" which man-
dated that they enroll in language instruction and classes on the "values of
French society."' O Francois Fillon, the Social Affairs Minister, explained that the
government was worried that without such a policy, France would dissolve into
distinct communities, thus undermining France's national identity.6' The fol-
lowing year, the French National Assembly and the French Senate voted in fa-
vor of a law banning the wearing of headscarves and other "ostentatious reli-
gious symbols" in public schools.62 The law was passed in response to the
recommendations of a nineteen-member commission, which concluded that
France's public school system "should be a neutral environment where the
56. Bimal Ghosh, The Challenge of Integration: A Global Perspective, in MANAGING IN-
TEGRATION, supra note 47, at 2, 5.
57. See, e.g., Rinus Penninx, Elements for an EU Framework for Integration Policies for
Immigrants, in MANAGING INTEGRATION, supra note 47, at 84; Charles Westin,
Ctr. for Research in International Migration and Ethnic Relations, Stockholm
Univ., Swed.: Restrictive Immigration Policy and Multiculturalism (June 2006)
(unpublished manuscript on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review), available at
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID= 4 o6.
58. Top 10 MIGRATION ISSUES, supra note 9.
59. Id.; see also Rainer BaubOck, Civic Citizenship: A New Concept for the New Europe,
in MANAGING INTEGRATION, supra note 47, at 122.
60. Sylvia Zappi, French Government Revives Assimilation Policy (Oct. 2003),
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Feature/display.cfm?ID=165; see also Gil-
bert, National Identity and Immigration Policy, supra note 36, at 124.
61. Zappi, supra note 60.
62. Kimberly Hamilton et al., The Challenge of French Diversity (Nov. 2004),
http://www.migrationinformation.org/Profiles/display.cfm?ID=266; see also
SARAH SONG, JUSTICE, GENDER AND THE POLITICS OF MULTICULTURALISM 174
(2007).
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principles of secularism, republicanism, and citizenship are taught and re-
flected."6"
Yet, despite recent setbacks for multiculturalism, many theorists in Canada
and Europe still embrace multicultural accommodation as the most culturally
sensitive approach to immigrant integration.6 4 This model recognizes the right
of different ethnic subgroups to define their own identities and, in some cases,
guarantees them limited group-based rights.6 For immigrant groups with cul-
tural and religious traditions distinct from the host society, like the Somali
Muslim community in Lewiston, such a model is appealing because it offers the
possibility of a certain degree of religious and cultural autonomy. At the same
time, Ayelet Shachar, in describing the "paradox of multicultural vulnerability,"
warns that, given the tendencies of many diaspora communities towards "reac-
tive culturalism," a policy of accommodation, while protective of cultural mi-
norities, risks infringing on the rights of individual group members, particularly
women.66 As will be demonstrated below, Lewiston officials have faced the chal-
lenge of accommodating the claims and demands of Somali elders who profess
to speak for the Somali community as a whole without causing de facto recog-
nition of a separate Somali sphere of authority.
Throughout the history of the United States, cultural and religious enclaves
have existed and often thrived, from the Amish who came to Pennsylvania in
the late 17OOS6 7 to the Mormons of Utah6" to the ethnic enclaves in San Fran-
cisco and New York City6 9 to the Arab-American community living in Dear-
born, Michigan to the Somalis in Lewiston, Maine today.70 Nonetheless, ac-
commodationist strategies akin to those being developed in Canada and parts of
Europe may be in tension with certain core principles in U.S. law and contrary
63. Hamilton et al., supra note 62.
64. See, e.g., SHACHAR, supra note lo, at 22-32.
65. Id. Will Kymlicka argues that a "comprehensive theory of justice in a multicul-
tural state will include both universal rights... and certain group-differentiated
rights or 'special status' for minority cultures." WILL KYMLICKA, MULTICULTURAL
CITIZENSHIP: A LIBERAL THEORY OF MINORITY RIGHTS 5 (1995). Kymlicka's
model would accord national minorities, such as indigenous cultures, the most
expansive rights, while entitling other ethnic groups, including immigrant and re-
ligious groups, less accommodation. Id. at 166-70; see also SHACHAR, supra note
io, at 29-32.
66. SHACHAR, supra note io, at 3, 11.
67. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 209-10 (1972).
68. See Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 168 (1878).
69. See generally NATHAN GLAZER & DANIEL MOYNIHAN, BEYOND THE MELTING POT:
THE NEGROES, PUERTO RICANS, JEWS, ITALIANS AND IRISH OF NEW YORK CITY
(1963) (discussing the different assimilation experiences of African-Americans,
Puerto Ricans, Jews, Italians, and the Irish).
70. See Finnegan, supra note 13.
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to a distinctly U.S. view of multiculturalism, which values diversity for the ways
in which it enriches our society as a whole.7
In fact, the term "accommodation" has acquired a different connotation in
U.S. jurisprudence. Although embraced by some jurists as the best model for
acknowledging the presence of religion in daily life and in government as well as
protecting free exercise rights under the First Amendment, 7 it has been criti-
cized by other jurists as the death knell for separation of church and state.73 Ac-
commodation has led the Supreme Court to uphold laws providing for public
funding of religious entities, including churches, religious schools, and other
faith-based initiatives.74 Extending accommodation in the United States to per-
mit religious minorities a degree of legal authority over their internal affairs,
however, such as the recent proposal by the Archbishop of Canterbury in Eng-
land to permit Shari'a and other religious courts to perform certain legal func-
tions,7 runs the risk of encouraging a kind of cultural and religious separatism
that would impede refugees' and immigrants' integration into society. As the
Archbishop acknowledged, such authority also could threaten the rights of
women and other subgroups within a community.76 By studying the role of
Lewiston government officials in working with Somali elders to address the
71. See, e.g., Martha Minow, Is Pluralism an Ideal or a Compromise? An Essay for Carol
Weisbrod, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1287, 1289-93 (2008); Martha Minow, Tolerance in an
Age of Terror, 16 S. CAL. INTERDIsC. L.J. 453, 456 (2007); Michael Walzer, The Poli-
tics of Difference, in THINKING POLITICALLY: ESSAYS IN POLITICAL THEORY 168,
18o-81 (Michael Walzer ed., 2007).
72. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 684 (2005).
73. Id. at 730-31 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
74. See, e.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005); Mitchell v.
Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
75. See Dr. Rowan Williams, Archbishop of Canterbury, Remarks on the Civil and
Religious Law in England at the Royal Courts of Justice (Feb. 7, 20o8), available at
http://www.archbishopofcanterbury.org/1575 (citing SHACHAR, supra note lo, and
proposing a carefully regulated system of supplementary jurisdiction by Shari'a
courts in Muslim communities in Great Britain that is protective of the rights of
women and religious minorities).
76. Id. Accommodation of religious minorities is a practice familiar to immigrants
from many Muslim countries. Through pacts or dhimmas, non-Muslim minori-
ties from tolerated religions, i.e., adherents of Christianity and Judaism, the
predecessor religions of Islam, have been given the right to practice their religions
and conduct their own communal affairs. LEwis & CHURCHILL, supra note io, at
10-11, 56. Unlike Muslims settling in the United States or the European Union,
however, religious minorities in most Muslim countries do not have access to citi-
zenship. Id. at lo-u. It is unclear whether accommodationists on the U.S. Su-
preme Court would extend this theory to religious and cultural minorities. In
practice, the approach has reflected a bias in favor of Christian or, at best, Judeo-
Christian belief systems. See supra note lo.
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Somali community's various needs, this Article tests the utility of a distinctly
accommodationist approach to immigrant integration.
For example, accommodation of the Somalis' religious, dress, and dietary
restrictions into the Lewiston Public School system has had both beneficial and
troubling implications!77 On the one hand, consistent with democratic princi-
ples of civic engagement, accommodation has involved members of the Somali
community in seeking a civic solution to their free exercise claims and has made
it more likely that traditional Muslim families will keep their children in the
public schools, thus furthering their incorporation into the life of the local
community!8s On the other hand, accommodation may have symbolically en-
dorsed the more conservative view of Islam embraced by Somali elders and
other members of their community, thus making it more difficult for other
Somalis, particularly women and girls who choose not to conform to prevailing
community norms, to exercise their rights without coercion or the threat of os-
tracism.79
In examining the theoretical foundations behind various naturalization re-
quirements, Gerald Neuman has noted that the justifiability of any naturaliza-
tion requirement depends on what theory of naturalization is adopted.s He has
identified a unilateral liberal perspective in which naturalization is an acceptable
means of safeguarding or advancing private interests;"i a bilateral liberal per-
spective where societal consent is as important as individual consent and where
societal focus is on the net benefits gained by naturalizing a particular appli-
cant;s" a republican perspective, where the primary emphasis is on political par-
ticipation as the purpose of citizenship and as demonstrating committed en-
gagement in the life of the community rather than self-interested protection of
private interests; 3 and a communitarian perspective where citizenship is a re-
flection of the identity of a community and its members, with individuals seek-
ing naturalization at some stage of their assimilation and where naturalization
requires some degree of assimilation to dominant cultural values .
4
Although this framework was developed to examine requirements in U.S.
naturalization law, it is valuable in understanding France's recent application of
its own naturalization statute to Faiza Silmi. According to the French adminis-
77. See infra Part IV.
78. See Martha Minow, Richard A. Schweder & Hazel Rose Markus, Pursuing Equal
Education in Societies of Difference, in JUST SCHOOLS, supra note 20, at 3, 13.
79. See Lindkvist, supra note 20, at 172.
8o. Gerald L. Neuman, Justifying U.S. Naturalization Policies, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 237,
238-39 (1994).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 239.
83. Id. at 240-41.
84. Id. at 241.
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trative agency report, Silmi's interview with social services revealed that she
lived in submission to her male relatives and that "the idea of challenging it has
never crossed her mind.""5 She also reportedly told French officials that she be-
lieved that only men should have the right to vote. 6 Yet while the administra-
tive tribunal raised concerns about Silmi's non-interest in politics, the Council
of State's decision focused primarily on her failure to assimilate and to adopt
the core French value of gender equality. These two approaches reflect the ten-
sions between a perspective that focuses on political participation as the princi-
pal good and one that emphasizes assimilation to core community values. In
emphasizing the French value of gender equality above all else, the Council of
State arguably gave insufficient weight to the fact that Silmi, despite her sup-
posed lack of interest in politics, had demonstrated civic engagement by not
only seeking French citizenship but by appealing the government's denial of her
application to the highest administrative body of France.17
Neuman's republican perspective also is useful in examining the experi-
ences of the Somalis of Lewiston, both in terms of their reception by the host
community and their own individual choices regarding citizenship, member-
ship, and belonging. As Sarah Song observes, minority cultures are often "con-
structed, polyvocal, and interactive" and "not as coherent and self-contained as
prominent defenders and critics of multiculturalism have assumed.""8 Although
traditional voices in immigrant communities may not represent the immigrant
community as a whole, they may claim to speak for a community and may de-
fine the way it is perceived and attempt to dictate the way it is to be treated. In
setting community standards for the accommodation of immigrants, local and
state officials must be circumspect in assessing who speaks for a particular im-
migrant communitys9 and careful not to endorse group practices inconsistent
with core democratic values of liberty and equality. At the same time, govern-
ment officials at the national level must be sensitive to both intergroup and in-
tragroup dynamics in developing norms and adjudicating naturalization appli-
cations and careful not to define community-based standards in such a way that
it runs the risk of further marginalizing women and other vulnerable groups.
II. A COMMUNITY-BASED ASSESSMENT OF GOOD MORAL CHARACTER
Historically, community norms have played an important role in adjudicat-
ing naturalization applications, which originally could be filed in "any common
85. Conclusions du Mine. Prada Bordenave, supra note 6, at 4.
86. Id. at 4; see also Posting of Kleine Brockhoff, supra note 8.
87. See, e.g., E-mail from Ayelet Shachar to Immigration Law Professors Listserve
(Aug. 3, 2oo8, 00:42:47 EST) (on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review).
88. SONG, supra note 62, at 169.
89. Nadeau, The Somalis of Lewiston, supra note 19, at 144; see also SONG, supra note
62, at 82.
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law court of record" in which an applicant had resided for at least the previous
year.90 This has been particularly true with regard to the "good moral character"
requirement in the naturalization statute, which mandates that an applicant
demonstrate that she is "a person of good moral character, attached to the prin-
ciples of the Constitution of the United States, and well disposed to the good
order and happiness of the United States."' Current regulations provide that
the naturalization examiner "shall evaluate claims of good moral character on a
case-by-case basis taking into account the elements enumerated in this section
and the standards of the average citizen in the community of residence.'"92
Although the character requirement has been part of U.S. citizenship law
since the first naturalization statute in 1790, the concept of what constitutes
"good moral character" has evolved over time. Interestingly, the first naturaliza-
tion statute required that an applicant demonstrate that he was a "person of
good character." 93 The addition of the word "moral" to the requirement in 1795
90. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795). This practice continued
for over ioo years. In 19o6, Congress eliminated the jurisdiction of most state
courts over petitions while creating a Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization
to oversee the naturalization process. Even though the Bureau played a central
role in reviewing naturalization applications, ultimate decisional authority still
rested in the district courts. Act of June 29, 19o6, Pub. L. No. 59-338, 34 Stat. 596
(19o6). In 199o, Congress transferred decisional authority over naturalization peti-
tions to what had become the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS).
Immigration and Nationality Act of 199o, Pub. L. No. lOl-649, 104 Stat. 4978
(199o) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421-1458 (2006)). For a helpful overview of the his-
tory of judicial naturalization, see Nancy Morawetz, Citizenship and the Courts,
2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 447, 451-54.
91. Immigration and Nationality Act of 199o (INA) § 316(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)
(2006). The INA does not define what good moral character is, but rather, what it
is not. For the current good moral character requirement, see INA § ioi(f), 8
U.S.C. § 11o1(f) (2006). Certain bars permanently disqualify an applicant, such as
murder, rape, sexual abuse of a minor, and the other aggravated felonies defined
in INA § lol(a)(43), 8 U.S.C. § lol(a)(43) (2006). Other bars only disqualify an
applicant during the statutory period, including the bars for habitual drunkards,
illegal gambling, and crimes involving moral turpitude. INA §§ ioi(f),
212(a)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. § llol(f) (1981). The statute also allows the examiner to take
into account other conduct as well as acts occurring outside the statutory period.
INA § 316(e), 8 U.S.C. § 1427(e) (2006). Although, as will be discussed below,
there have been changes to the statutory definition of good moral character over
the years, the structure of the current statute resembles in many respects the
original INA passed in 1952. See Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477,
66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (2006)).
92. 8 C.F.R. § 316.1o(a)(2) (2006) (emphasis added). The current statutory require-
ments for naturalization impose a three-month state residency requirement on
naturalization applicants, in addition to the five-year continuous residency re-
quirement. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a) (2006).
93. Act of Mar. 26, 1790, ch. 3, § 1, 1 Stat. 103 (repealed 1795).
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was initially opposed by some legislators as religiously-based. This opposition
was ultimately overcome, however, with the argument that omitting the word
"moral" would "slander the American character. '94 Thus, from its beginnings, a
core culture model of citizenship has been in tension with a more liberal model
where civic virtue can exist independently of religion.95
In the late nineteenth century, lower courts began to clarify the content of
the good moral character requirement. The first reported naturalization case to
explore good moral character was the 1878 decision In re Spenser.96 In that case,
the court determined that the good moral character test required an inquiry
into both a person's behavior as well as his nature: "Character consists of the
qualities which constitute the individual; reputation the sum of opinions enter-
tained concerning him. The former is interior, the latter external. The one is the
substance, the other the shadow." 97 The court in Spenser acknowledged that the
standard for good moral character will vary from generation to generation, and
that "probably the average man of the country is as high as it can be set."'
During much of the twentieth century, the U.S. Immigration Service and
many district court judges invoked a community-based standard in assessing
the good moral character of naturalization applicants. The original rationale for
applying a community-based standard was that:
[G]ood moral character is one that measures up as good among the
people of the community in which the party lives; that is, up to the stan-
dard of the average citizen .... It is not contended that the applicant
must be able to rise to such moral elevation that he may analyze, criti-
cize and reject the prevailing opinions and settled convictions of his fel-
lowmen .... To meet such a test a man must be a philosopher, while
the statute is satisfied with a citizen whose behavior is up to the level of
the average citizen. 99
94. See Strange, supra note 25, at 358 n.4.
95. See, e.g., Lance Banning, James Madison, the Statute for Religious Freedom, and the
Crisis of Republican Convictions, in THE VIRGINIA STATUTE FOR RELIGIOUS FREE-
DOM: ITS EVOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCES IN AMERICAN HISTORY 109-38 (Merrill
D. Peterson & Robert C. Vaughan eds., 1988).
96. 22 F. Cas. 921 (C.C.D. Or. 1878).
97. Id.
98. Id. The court also indicated that whatever is forbidden by law ought generally to
be considered immoral, while suggesting that some distinction should be drawn
between conduct malum en se and conduct malum prohibitum, as well as between
an isolated act of wrongdoing versus habitual misconduct. At the same time, it
found that certain "infamous crimes," such as murder, robbery, theft, bribery,
and perjury, should automatically disqualify an applicant from demonstrating
good moral character. Id. at 921-22.
99. In re Hopp, 179 F. 561, 563 (E.D. Wis. 191o) (emphasis added).
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In that case, the applicant, Albert Hopp, was a saloon keeper in the city of Mil-
waukee, Wisconsin. It was estimated that 75% of the population was foreign-
born and that of these many were of German extraction. During naturalization
proceedings, the government determined that Hopp had violated Wisconsin's
Sunday closing law and thus could not demonstrate good moral character. The
district court, however, declined to find that this demonstrated a lack of good
moral character. The district court judge reasoned that:
The old German adheres with tenacity to the habits and customs of the
fatherland. He wishes to have the saloon kept open on Sunday, not for
the purpose of revelry or debauch, but as a meeting place for friends
and neighbors, and he looks upon it as his club, where he may associate
in a friendly way with acquaintances, sip his beer, and smoke his pipe.
He views it purely as a social matter. During all these years no drunk-
enness or disorder has resulted. Ardent temperance people, seeing that
no evil results from this practice in this community, have ceased all agi-
tation on the subject. In short, the public sentiment of the city is in
harmony with the views suggested by the applicant in his testimony.' 0
In this 191o decision, which predates Prohibition and World War I, the court
suggested that good moral character should be measured both by the norms of
the immigrant community and the norms of the host community. Here, because
it was the practice of German immigrants in Milwaukee to meet and socialize
on Sundays and because the "temperance people" had apparently accepted the
practice, the applicant's violation of the Sunday dosing act was not deemed to
demonstrate a lack of good moral character.
In re Hopp, which might be seen as an early example of multicultural ac-
commodation, was an early departure from the emerging judicial norm that
violation of state or local laws constituted proof of a lack of good moral charac-
ter.' The court's vision of the relatively peaceful coexistence of the host society
and the immigrant community suggested that, to the extent federal regulations
require naturalization examiners to consider community standards in assessing
good moral character, it is appropriate to take into account both the norms of
loo. Id. at 562.
lOl. Indeed, in other naturalization cases decided during this period involving peti-
tioners accused of violating state or federal liquor laws, the courts held that such
violations were not the behavior of persons of good moral character. See, e.g., In re
Bonner, 279 F. 789 (D. Mont. 1922) (finding that where the offense committed was
gravely denounced by the National Prohibition Act and a direct violation of the
18th Amendment, petitioner was not "well disposed to the good order and happi-
ness" of the nation and its people); In re Trum, 199 F. 361, 363 (W.D. Mo. 1912)
("Defiance of the established order.., constitutes bad citizenship, bad behavior,
and if persisted in, indicates a perverted moral character."); United States v. Ger-
stein, 284 Ill. 174 (1918) (criticizing and refusing to follow Hopp); In re Hrasky, 240
Ill. 560 (19o9) (holding that a person has not behaved as a man of good moral
character, and one well disposed to the good order of this country, if he has ha-
bitually, knowingly, and willfully violated the Sunday closing law).
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the host community and those of the immigrant group, rather than basing their
decisions narrowly on state or local law. At the same time, some of the prob-
lems inherent in such an approach emerge when one considers whether the
outcome in Hopp would have been the same if the case had been decided a few
years later, after the outbreak of World War I, mounting hostility to German
immigrants, and the growth of the temperance movement.' °2 Furthermore, a
definition of community norms based on the values of the immigrant commu-
nity, while appealing in light of Hopp, runs the risk in other contexts of permit-
ting a kind of cultural relativism that may be contrary to the rights of an immi-
grant group's most vulnerable members." 3
Throughout most of the twentieth century, a split emerged between courts
that applied a community-standards definition of good moral character and
those in search of a national standard. Much of the case law on good moral
character involved applicants accused of violating state mores legislation, in-
cluding laws against adultery, fornication, bigamy, homosexuality, abandon-
ment, illicit cohabitation, and incest. 0 4 Throughout the 1940s and into the
1950s, the Immigration Service, invoking a community-based standard, op-
posed naturalization in dozens of cases on the grounds that the applicant had
failed to demonstrate good moral character because the applicant had violated
state mores legislation.'015 While in many instances the applicant had been
charged under state law, in others, the applicant had not been criminally
charged or found civilly liable, but the Immigration Service assumed the role of
"morality police," uncovering wrongdoing during the investigative phase (and
in at least one case, after citizenship had already been granted) and opposing
the applicant's naturalization in district court for failure to establish good moral
character." 6 During this period, while many courts deferred to the Service's ap-
proach, looking to state laws to determine the proper community standard, 07
other courts questioned the Service's reliance on state and local law, arguing for
a uniform federal standard focused on whether a person's character conformed
to the "generally accepted moral conventions current at the time."'' 8
102. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397-98 (1923) (finding that, although the
desire of the Nebraska legislature to foster a homogeneous people with American
ideals was understandable, this did not justify the law's interference with parents'
fundamental rights to control the upbringing of their children and to teach them
in German).
103. See SONG, supra note 62, at 87-113.
104. See generally Woerner, supra note 26, §§ 10-13.
105. See generally Strange, supra note 25.
io6. See, e.g., United States v. Cloutier, 87 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Mich. 1949).
107. See, e.g., In re Barug, 76 F. Supp. 407, 409 (N.D. Cal. 1948); In re Mogus, 73 F.
Supp. 150 (W.D. Pa. 1947); In re Paoli, 49 F. Supp. 128 (N.D. Cal. 1943); In re
Hopp, 179 F. 561, 563 (E.D. Wis. 191o).
lO8. See Johnson v. United States, 186 F.2d 588 (2d Cir. 1951); Schmidt v. United States,
177 F.2d 450 (2d Cir. 1949); Repouille v. United States, 165 F.2d 152 (2d Cir. 1947);
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During this period, a rich body of case law on the good moral character re-
quirement emerged that reflected a normative, almost philosophical approach
to determining good moral character that was rooted in Christian values and
English common law.' 9 As New Jersey District Court Judge Fake wrote in 1947:
In considering moral character it is not easy to draw a line between
principles which fall in the sphere of the ecclesiastical law and those
which are exclusively within the temporal sphere. Moreover, with our
traditions and our Anglo-Saxon approach, it is difficult indeed to rea-
son on ethics at all without entering into the sphere of Christian, or
biblical ethics, since our laws are so permeated with what Blackstone
refers to as the "Revealed Law".... Moreover, as we have seen, the
generally accepted rules of morality or ethics fluctuate in each era and
the best we can do with the subject is to apply the generally accepted
rules of our own day. The statutory words "good moral character" do
not confine us to the ecclesiastical sphere nor yet to the temporal. We
may enter the philosophical wherein the two are mingled.110
The first statutory definition of good moral character did not emerge until
the McCarran-Walter Act of 1952 (the INA)!" That year, Congress added what
is still § loi(f) to the naturalization statute, listing a series of offenses that would
preclude a person from demonstrating good moral character. Adultery was
number two on the list."2 In addition, the statute allowed the examiner to con-
sider conduct and acts occurring outside the statutory period, and to determine
that other offenses not defined in the statute could also demonstrate a lack of
good moral character."3
United States v. Francioso, 164 F.2d 163 (2d Cir. 1947); see also In re Lieberman, 50
F. Supp. 121 (E.D.N.Y. 1943). Prior to the 1952 statute, at least one district court
judge argued that, consistent with the Erie Doctrine, he was not obligated to fol-
low state law because there was a federal statute at issue. Lieberman, 50 F. Supp. at
122. This view was later adopted by the Board of Immigration Appeals in a 1946
case. See B-, 2 I. & N. Dec. 617 (1946).
1O9. See, e.g., Schmidt v. United States, 177 F.2d 450, 451-52 (2d Cir. 1949); In re Edgar,
253 F. Supp. 951, 953 (E.D. Mich. 1966) (discussing the necessary variables for de-
termining good moral character in light of a national society standard while refer-
ring to weighing the individual facts of these cases as "sins" and considering
whether citizenship to said sinners ought to be offered as they may contaminate
the "purity of our stock"); In re Hopp, 179 F. at 562-63; In re Smith, 71 F. Supp.
968, 972-73 (D.N.J. 1947).
11o. Smith, 71 F. Supp. at 972-73.
iii. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified at 8
U.S.C. §§ 1101-1503 (2006)).
112. Id. § 1oi(f).
113. Id. Under current immigration regulations and interpretations, other offenses
demonstrating a lack of good character include failure to pay child support or
federal income taxes and certain adulterous or homosexual acts, particularly ones
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Rather than resolving the split in the case law, Congress's adoption in 1952
of a statutory definition of good moral character only exacerbated the contro-
versy. For example, although adultery was included among the automatic statu-
tory bars to demonstrating "good moral character," because Congress did not
define adultery in the statute, district courts were faced with the question of
whether to apply state law definitions, which tended to vary widely, or a uni-
form federal definition. 14 Some courts argued that Congress's failure to define
adultery in the statute indicated its intent that good moral character be deter-
mined by community standards."5 Other courts argued that the 1952 statute, in
making adultery an automatic bar, indicated a congressional intent to create a
uniform national standard."6 Adding to the confusion, by permitting adjudica-
tors to find that other offenses not specifically listed could also demonstrate a
lack of good moral character,17 Congress gave the Immigration Service discre-
tion to find a lack of good moral character based on violations of state mores
legislation not even mentioned in the statute.
Under either approach, judges often recognized that assessments of good
moral character frequently were based on a judge's conjecture of what consti-
tuted community sentiment. Addressing the question of how to determine
community standards, Judge Learned Hand cynically wrote in the 1949 Schmidt
case that:
it must be owned that the law upon the subject is not free from doubt.
We do not see how we can get any help from outside. It would not be
practicable.., to conduct an inquiry as to what is the common con-
science on the point. Even though we could take a poll, it would not be
enough merely to count heads, without any appraisal of the voters. A
majority of the votes of those in prisons and brothels, for instance,
ought scarcely to outweigh the votes of accredited churchgoers. Nor
that lead to the destruction of an existing marriage. See 8 C.F.R. § 316.1o(b)
(20o6); INS Interp. Ltr., supra note 28, § 316.1(0. If an applicant has committed
one of these discretionary bars, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Ex-
aminer is obliged to weigh such offenses against the positive equities in the appli-
cant's case and cannot automatically deny on this basis alone. Id.
114. Hertz, supra note 25, at 296.
115. See, e.g., In re Mogus, 73 F. Supp. 150, 152 (W.D. Pa. 1947); In re Paoli, 49 F. Supp.
128, 131 (N.D. Cal. 1943).
116. See, e.g., In re Russo, 259 F. Supp. 230 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); In re Edgar, 253 F. Supp.
951, 953 (E.D. Mich. 1966); In re Briedis, 238 F. Supp. 149, 151 (N.D. Ill. 1965). Ac-
cording to this argument, Congress could not possibly have intended the outcome
of a particular applicant's naturalization petition to turn on a question of state
law, since this "would lead to an absurb [sic] patchwork result, resting a peti-
tioner's right to United States citizenship upon the whims and idiosyncrasies of
individual state legislatures." Id. at 15o.
117. See 8 U.S.C. § 11o(f) (20o6).
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can we see any reason to suppose that the opinion of clergymen would
be a more reliable estimate than our own."6
By the 197os, cases involving naturalization applicants accused of violating
state mores legislation had become less common, particularly following the U.S.
Supreme Court's decisions in Griswold v. Connecticut,"9 Eisenstadt v. Baird,2 '
and their progeny, which limited the state's power to regulate matters of sexual
intimacy. 2' During this period, at least one district attempted to reconcile the
community standards approach with the uniform standards test, finding that,
in cases where Congress had not directly spoken, the court should look first to
community standards in determining good moral character and then, if the ap-
plicant failed that test, to the common conscience of the country to see whether
the country as a whole would look unfavorably upon the conduct. 2
The Fourth Circuit's 1981 decision in Nemetz v. INS 3 ultimately led to an
important shift in the Service's approach and to a greater emphasis on uniform
standards.' 4 In Nemetz, the applicant had been prosecuted under the state sod-
omy law. Initially, the Service argued that this constituted evidence of the peti-
tioner's lack of good moral character. The Fourth Circuit in that case, however,
held that "whether a person is of good moral character for purposes of naturali-
zation law is a question of federal law." 5 Reliance on state sodomy laws as a ba-
sis for denying naturalization would allow for inconsistent results since homo-
sexual persons living in states without sodomy laws would be granted
naturalization while those in states with sodomy laws would be denied citizen-
118. Schmidt v. United States, 177 F.2d 450, 451 (2d Cir. 1949); see also Edgar, 253 F.
Supp. at 953.
119. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that the state birth control law intruded upon the
constitutionally protected right to marital privacy).
120. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (finding that a Massachusetts state law that allowed married
persons to obtain contraception while prohibiting unmarried persons from doing
so violated the equal protection clause).
121. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86 (describing the "precincts of marital bedrooms" as
sacred and the search of said areas for contraceptives as "repulsive to the notions
of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship").
122. In re Sousounis, 239 F. Supp. 126, 128 (E.D. Pa. 1965) (citing In re Mayall, 154 F.
Supp. 556, 560 (E.D. Pa. 1957)).
123. 647 F.2d 432 (4 th Cir. 1981).
124. See Hawley, supra note 28, at 12-13. Interestingly, Nemetz can be seen as a harbin-
ger of Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), in which the Supreme Court over-
turned a Texas statute criminalizing homosexual sodomy, even though Nemetz
actually predates the Supreme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S.
186 (1986), which found that there was no fundamental right to engage in homo-
sexual sodomy.
125. Nemetz, 647 F.2d at 435.
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ship based on lack of good moral character.126 In attempting to reconcile the
community-based standards test with the uniformity principle, the Court wrote
that, while in most cases "state law will be the best barometer of the conscience
of the country as a whole," in cases where certain private acts are subject to
"radically different legislative treatment by the states" the focus must be not on
whether the act is offensive to personal morality, but rather, whether it is harm-
ful to the public.27
The INS subsequently amended its interpretation of the "good moral char-
acter" requirement to adopt the approach taken by the Court in Nemetz. Today,
the focus of the Service is not on whether a petitioner has violated state laws
criminalizing homosexual conduct but whether the conduct in question is con-
sidered harmful to the public.2 The decision in Nemetz coincided with the de-
cision by Congress that same year to remove adultery from the statute as an
automatic bar to good moral character. 9 The House Report indicated "that the
Immigration Service should not be required to inquire into the sex lives of ap-
plicants for naturalization. Such questions clearly represent an invasion of pri-
vacy." 3'
In 199o, Congress transferred decisional authority over naturalization peti-
tions from the federal district courts to the INS, replacing the system of judicial
naturalization that has existed virtually since the founding of the Republic with
a system of administrative naturalization. 3' Although district court judges, by
126. Id. at 435.
127. Id. at 436.
128. "[Tlhe Service view is that a showing of good moral character is precluded where
the homosexual practices have adverse public effects: where the homosexual act
involves minors, or the use of threat or fraud, or the taking or giving of money or
anything of value, or the act of solicitation thereof in a public place, or the homo-
sexual act itself is engaged in a public place, or the conduct is violation of marital
vows." INS Interp. Ltr., supra note 28, § 316.1 (f(7).
129. Immigration and Nationality Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-116, § 2(c),
95 Stat. 1611 (1981) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 11Ol (1981)).
130. H.R. REP. No. 97-264 at 19 (1981), reprinted in 199o U.S.C.C.A.N. 2577, 2588. De-
spite this important shift in citizenship norms towards a uniformity principle
consistent with basic rights, it is worth noting that the Immigration Service has
demonstrated a particular concern with the sanctity of traditional marriage in ap-
plying the discretionary bars to good moral character. It can still find a lack of
good moral character where the petitioner has engaged in adultery or homosexual
conduct that, respectively, "tend[s] to destroy an existing marriage" or "is viola-
tive of marital vows." 8 C.F.R. § 316.1o(b)(3)(ii) (2006); INS Interp. Ltr., supra
note 28, § 316.1(f)(7); see also Ariela R. Dubler, Immoral Purposes: Marriage and the
Genus of Illicit Sex, 115 YALE L.J. 756, 763-65 (2oo6) (discussing the pivotal role
marriage has played in the regulation of illicit and licit sex).
131. Immigration Act of 199o, Pub. L. No. l1-649, §§ 401-4o8, 104 Stat. 4978 (1990),
discussed in Robert A. Mautino, Naturalization Under the Immigration Act of 199o,
92-07 IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS 1 (1992).
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statute, still have the power of de novo review in revisiting denials by the Natu-
ralization Unit, today, Homeland Security's U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services exercises the power to naturalize persons as citizens of the United
States.132 This has several important implications. First, naturalization examin-
ers' discretion in determining whether or not an applicant meets the require-
ments for citizenship has grown considerably. Whereas in the past they would
make recommendations to district court judges to find a lack of good moral
character, today they can either issue denials based on these grounds, shifting
the burden to the applicant to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking
relief in district court, or they can encourage applicants to withdraw their appli-
cations altogether, thus subverting the review process. 3 3 Second, the new system
has largely eliminated transparency in the naturalization process, which was one
of the hallmarks of a judicial naturalization system. Even the system of adminis-
trative review, unlike immigration appeals before the Board of Immigration
Appeals, is an abbreviated one, requiring only that an application be reheard by
an immigration officer, 3 4 who generally is someone of equal or higher rank.
35
Notices of Denial are essentially form letters with brief explanations of the spe-
cific reasons an application has been denied and are not available as published
or unpublished opinions.36 Third, the rich body of naturalization case law from
the federal district courts is now largely a relic of the past, with most modern
decisions being limited to cases involving persons barred from naturalizing be-
cause of false testimony or criminal convictions. 37 As a result, lawyers and re-
132. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1421(a), 1421(c) (2006) (granting sole authority to naturalize per-
sons as citizens of the United States to the Attorney General but providing for de
novo review in district court of denials of naturalization applications); see also
Homeland Security Act, Pub. L. 107-296, § 451(a)-(b), 116 Stat. 2195, 2195 (2002)
(establishing USCIS as part of the Department of Homeland Security and trans-
ferring functions from the Commissioner of the INS to the Director of the
USCIS).
133. See 8 C.F.R. § 336.9 (2006) (requiring, under current requirements, exhaustion of
administrative remedies prior to judicial review of denial of naturalization appli-
cation); Morawetz, supra note 90, at 452-53 (discussing the role of the INS in the
old system of judicial naturalization); Arnold Rochvarg, Report to the Administra-
tive Conference-Reforming the Administrative Naturalization Process: Reducing
Delays While Increasing Fairness, 9 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 397, 432-34 (2005) (express-
ing concern that examiners have encouraged withdrawals of naturalization appli-
cations in a way that may defeat judicial review and eliminate the check on ad-
ministrative discretion).
134. 8 U.S.C. § 1447(a) (2006).
135. 8 C.F.R. § 336.2(b) (2006).
136. 8 C.F.R. § 336.1(b) (20o6).
137. See, e.g., Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759 (1988); United States v. Lekarczyk,
354 F. Supp. 2d 883 (W.D. Wis. 2005); Laryea v. United States, 300 F. Supp. 2d 404
(E.D. Va. 2004); Cacho v. Ashcroft, 403 F. Supp. 2d 991 (D. Haw. 2004). Further-
more, most persons denied naturalization because of criminal convictions that are
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searchers are greatly hindered in identifying the standards that Naturalization
Examiners are applying and in determining whether they are being dictated by
uniform federal standards or community norms.
Nonetheless, despite the lack of transparency under the new system, there is
evidence that the role of the Immigration Service as "morality police" is alive
and well. In the District Office of Portland, Maine, Beth Stickney, the Executive
Director of ILAP, the only immigration legal services agency in the state, re-
ported that although the Service rarely inquired into adulterous or homosexual
conduct in adjudicating naturalization applications, one major concern has
been with fathers who fail to pay child support.' 3s An applicant who has "will-
fully failed or refused to support dependents" will be found by the Service to
lack good moral character unless he or she can establish extenuating circum-
stances. 39 District offices have tended to enforce this discretionary bar strictly,
either through denying applications or by delaying them pending proof from
the applicant, as demonstrated by anecdotal evidence and the limited case law
available. 140 Over the next several years, as more Somalis in Lewiston and sur-
rounding areas become eligible to apply for naturalization, this focus will likely
create barriers to naturalization and, as discussed further below, may also un-
cover an enduring community norm that could impose new barriers to citizen-
ship for at least some Somalis: the practice of polygamy, 41 a potential bar to es-
also deportable offenses are generally placed into removal proceedings, and thus
do not have the opportunity to challenge the naturalization decision in district
court. See Gatcliffe v. Reno, 23 F. Supp. 2d 581 (D.V.I. 1998); 8 U.S.C. § 1229
(2006).
138. E-mail from Beth Stickney, Executive Director, Immigrant Legal Advocacy Pro-
ject, Portland, Me., to Lauren Gilbert, Assoc. Professor of Law, St. Thomas Univ.
(June 19, 2008, 13:09:33 EST) [hereinafter E-mail from Beth Stickney] (on file with
the Yale Law & Policy Review).
139. 8 C.F.R. § 316.1o(b)(3)(i) (2006).
140. See Dirir v. Mukasey, 2008 WL 687440 (W.D. Wash. 2008); Zhai v. U.S.C.I.S.,
2004 WL 1960195 (N.D. Cal. 2004); see also E-mail from Evelyn Cruz, Dir., Immi-
gration Clinic, Ariz. State Univ., to Lauren Gilbert, Assoc. Professor of Law, St.
Thomas Univ. (Dec. 5, 2008, 20:50:26 MST) (on file with the Yale Law & Policy
Review); E-mail from Beth Stickney, supra note 138 (responding to the author's
query as to how the U.S.C.I.S. District Office in Portland, Maine dealt with discre-
tionary bases for finding a lack of good moral character, particularly those involv-
ing adultery, homosexuality and failure to support dependents and indicating that
the District Office in Maine was "very strict here on child support, but less strict
than [she] used to experience when [she] used to work in Boston on adultery").
141. Several persons reported that Somali men in polygamous unions were required by
the U.S. government to divorce all but their first wives as a condition of their ad-
mission as refugees. Subsequent wives and children were often admitted as refu-
gees separately. Some of these family members resettled in Lewiston, and in some
circumstances, particularly in the Bantu community, may have resumed their old
households. Interview with Patricia Buck, Assoc. Professor, Bates Coll., in Port-
land, Me. (July 22, 2008) [hereinafter Interview with Patricia Buck] (on file with
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tablishing good moral character.' 4 In the event that naturalization examiners
decide to focus on this issue, one of the remaining sexual taboos in U.S. law
could lead to renewed attention to both the sexual mores of certain segments of
the Somali community and to the legitimacy of defining good moral character
in terms of the standards of the host society, without considering the customs
and norms from an immigrant's own culture.
The next Part explores external and internal barriers to the Somalis' access
to U.S. citizenship and to their integration into the social fabric of Lewiston,
Maine, a largely Roman Catholic, former mill town built by Irish and French
Canadian immigrants. Once discriminated against by Lewiston's Protestant
forefathers, today their descendents constitute the city's dominant culture.' 43
The tension between local community norms and the norms and values of the
Somali community stands as an additional obstacle to the Somalis' access to full
membership and belonging.
III. THE SOMALIS OF LEWISTON
A. The Back Story
In 2001, the town of Lewiston, Maine, about thirty miles north of the city of
Portland, embarked on a new course, less by choice than by necessity. That
year, Somali refugees from the Horn of Africa that the U.S. government had re-
settled in Atlanta, Memphis, New Orleans, Minneapolis, Columbus, and other
urban areas, decided to relocate to this Franco-American town of approxi-
mately 30,000 residents. The Somalis' decision to move to this largely Roman
Catholic town was reached after elders sent scouts across America in search of a
home where the Somalis could raise their families and practice their religion in
relative peace.' 44 Somali families who had been resettled in urban areas grew in-
creasingly alarmed by what they saw as the impact of crime, drugs, gangs, and
black urban culture on their children. 45 That the population of Lewiston was
the Yale Law & Policy Review); Interview with I.R., in Lewiston, Me. (July lo,
20o8) [hereinafter Interview with I.R.] (on file with author).
142. See 8 U.S.C. §§ 11o1(f), 1182(a)(lo)(A) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 3 16.1o(b)(2)(ix) (2006).
143. See JOHN A. RAND, THE PEOPLES OF LEWISTON-AUBURN, MAINE 1875-1975, at 4-6
(1975).
144. Bouchard, supra note 11; Nadeau, The Somalis of Lewiston, supra note 19, at 14.
Today, there are an estimated 3000 to 3500 Somalis, most of them Muslim, in the
City of Lewiston, giving Lewiston the largest Somali population, per capita, in
America, topped only by the Twin Cities of Minnesota in terms of sheer numbers.
Id.
145. Bouchard, supra note 11. Many Somalis acknowledged tensions with the African
American community in these cities and feared assimilation to that culture. Kelley
Bouchard, Diversity Expert Takes Up Challenge in Lewiston, ME. SUNDAY TELE-
GRAM (Portland, Me.), Dec. 8, 2002, at Al.
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97% Caucasian was viewed by many Somalis as a positive feature that would
better enable them to establish a tightly knit community, maintain their Somali
identity, and practice their Muslim faith. 46
Historically, geographic mobility has played an important role in Somali
culture, particularly for the nomadic clans, with communities moving from
place to place in order to survive the harsh conditions of both the natural and
socio-political worlds.147 Cindy Horst has examined the decision of many So-
mali refugees to leave Somalia for refugee camps in Kenya, comparing this to
the traditional practice of "scouting" in Somalia by which the community
would send out individuals who would evaluate grazing, physical safety, the
socio-cultural environment, and livelihood opportunities in different parts of
the region.1' s Elders would send scouts, or sahans, into the arid desert to search
for lightning, "a sure sign that a storm is brewing on the horizon."'49 In late
2000, a group of Somalis in Atlanta devised a sahan plan to send groups of So-
malis across America, to San Diego, Kansas City, Dearborn, Michigan, and
Portland, Maine, in search of a new home.5 The decision of the Somali elders
literally to seek out greener pastures by moving their people from these urban
centers to Lewiston, a small city surrounded by farms and forests, was consis-
tent with many Somalis' nomadic pastoral identity as well as with their religious
identity as Muslims, which encourages pilgrimages to Mecca (hajj) and the mi-
gration from lands where Muslim religious practices are restricted (hijra).5'
The Somalis' arrival in Lewiston in 2001, however, was not particularly
well-timed, coming the same year as the September 11 attacks and the release of
the movie "Black Hawk Down," which features American soldiers being
dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by marauding Somalis.5 One of the
soldiers killed was Staff Sergeant Thomas J. Field, a resident of the neighboring
146. See Bouchard, supra note 11; Maggie Jones, The New Yankees, MOTHER JONES,
Mar.-Apr. 2004, at 64.
147. CINDY HORST, TRANSNATIONAL NOMADS: How SOMALIS COPE WITH REFUGEE
LIFE IN THE DADAAB CAMPS OF KENYA 65 (2006); see also I.M. LEWIS, A MODERN
HISTORY OF THE SOMALI 9 (4th ed. 2002) (describing nomadic tradition of Soma-
lis, who "move about their country with their livestock in search of pasture and
water, ordering their movements as closely as possible to the distribution of these
two necessities of life").
148. HORST, supra note 147, at 65-66.
149. Kelley Bouchard, Lewiston's Somali Surge, ME. SUNDAY TELEGRAM (Portland,
Me.), Apr. 28, 2002, at 1A.
150. Jones, supra note 146, at 66.
151. HORST, supra note 147, at 66-67.
152. See, e.g., Nadya Labi, Give Us Your Tired... Just Not All of Them, TIME, Oct. 28,
2002, at 1O; Susan Taylor Martin, A Collision of Cultures Leads to Building Bridges
in Maine, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Mar. 13, 2005, at A1; Moore, supra note 15; THE
LETTER, supra note 15.
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town of Lisbon.' The state highway that connects Lisbon and Lewiston is
named in his honor, a harsh reminder for many local residents.'
5 4
Despite the Somali elders' perception that Lewiston, Maine, would be a safe
place to settle, the transition would not be easy for either the Somalis or Lewis-
tonians. Maine has the reputation of being quite insular, and Mainers tend to
distinguish themselves from those "from away," meaning anyone not born in
the state." Founded in 1820 when it broke away from its parent, Massachusetts,
this New England state, tucked into the northeast corner of the country, is
known for its rugged individualists, many of whom have made their lives off the
land, and its spirit of independence.'5
6
At the same time, many Lewiston residents are themselves descendants of
Irish and French Canadian immigrants who came in the mid-18oos to work in
the textile mils.5 7 Both minority groups faced discrimination and even persecu-
tion at the hands of their Yankee neighbors. It is largely thanks to the role of the
Catholic Church and the Grey Nuns, who established L'H6pital Gn6ral Ste.
Marie (St. Mary's Hospital) in the late 1800s, that a system of social services
eventually developed to meet the needs of the most vulnerable members of so-
ciety.' Eventually, Franco-Americans came to dominate the local scene, and
today many Lewiston residents carry the surnames of their French Canadian
ancestors.5 9
When the Somalis began to arrive in early 2001, many groups in the com-
munity, including Catholic Charities, St. Mary's Hospital, and the City of
Lewiston pulled together to meet their needs. Mayor Kaileigh Tara welcomed
the newcomers to this once-thriving mill town, indicating that they not only
would bring the "richness of their culture" but would help revitalize the econ-
153. See THE LETTER, supra note 15, at 4:00-4:55 (quoting City Administrator James
Bennet saying that the highway named after Thomas J. Field is a daily reminder
that one of their residents died in Somalia).
154. Id.; see also Roger D. McGrath, Coming to America: The Great Somali Welfare
Hunt, AM. CONSERVATIVE, Nov. 18, 2002, at 13; Interview with Phil Nadeau, Dep-
uty City Adm'r, City of Lewiston, Me., in Lewiston, Me. (July 1, 2008) [hereinafter
Interview with Phil Nadeau] (on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review). Lewiston
Chapter 2699 of the Military Order of the Purple Heart is also named after Tho-
mas J. Field. David A. Sargent, 'Courage and Selfless Service,' SUN J. (Lewiston,
Me.), May 25, 2008, available at http://www.sunjournal.com/story/267125-3/
LewistonAuburn/Courage-and-selfless service/.
155. Abby Goodnough, Threat in Maine, the Whitest State, Shakes Local N.A.A.C.P.,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2007, at A16.
156. CHARLOTTE MICHAUD, LEWISTON's FRANCO-AMERICANS: THEIR ORIGINS AND
EARLY HISTORY 7-8 (1974).
157. RAND, supra note 143, at 4-6.
158. SUSAN P. HUDSON, THE QUIET REVOLUTIONARIES: How THE GREY NUNS
CHANGED THE SOCIAL WELFARE PARADIGM OF LEWISTON, MAINE 113-15 (2006).
159. MICHAUD, supra note 156, at 7.
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omy.16° Yet, after the first group of Somali refugees arrived in early 2001, Soma-
lis began to come by the busload, overwhelming the city's capacity. 6 ' Rumors
circulated that Somalis were receiving vouchers for free cars, and members of
the community expressed concern about how the Somalis' access to social ser-
vices would impact taxpayers and the city's poor.62
A common question to city officials during that time period was, "Who au-
thorized this?" 6 City administrators tried to explain to residents that the Soma-
lis had come to Lewiston on their own rather than as part of any U.S. resettle-
ment strategy and that, as legal residents, they could choose to live where they
wanted. Administrators downplayed the influx as "no big deal," but, as elected
officials were bombarded with questions and complaints from their constitu-
ents, a decision was made to hold a town hall meeting.'6 4 City administrators
knew that this would largely attract "people with an ax to grind" and that, at
best, people would have an opportunity to "blow off some steam" but ulti-
mately would probably walk away unhappy. Additionally, a town hall meeting
was likely to attract media frenzy, and administrators would have to deal with
the consequences. 65
In May 2002, the City convened a town hall meeting.'66 Speakers included
city administrators, social service providers, non-profit agencies, city police,
and representatives from the Somali community.17 Elected officials were visibly
absent,6 ' and, as administrators had predicted, the meeting only resulted in a
hardening of positions.'6 While many at the meeting celebrated Lewiston's his-
tory as a city of immigrants, comparing the Somalis' arrival to the influx of
French Canadians in the 1870s, others called for a moratorium on immigration,
arguing that the city should take care of its own.' According to Deputy City
Administrator Phil Nadeau, prior to the meeting, residents had complained that
16o. Deepa Rao, The "Somali Invasion," CHANGE AGENT, Mar. 2005, at 41.
161. NADEAU, supra note 14, app. B at 13-15.
162. Nadeau, The Somalis of Lewiston, supra note 19, at 122.
163. Interview with Phil Nadeau, supra note 154.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Kelley Bouchard, Lewiston Airs Concerns over Somali Influx; A Public Meeting
Draws both Support for and Worry over the City's Swelling Population of Immi-
grants, PRESS HERALD (Portland, Me.), May 15, 2002, at 2B; see also Nadeau, The
Somalis of Lewiston, supra note 19, at 122.
167. Interview with Phil Nadeau, supra note 154.
168. Id.
169. Nadeau, The Somalis of Lewiston, supra note 19, at 122.
170. Bouchard, supra note 166.
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they were not getting answers regarding the Somali presence; after the meeting,
they complained that they were not getting the answers they wanted. 17
Subsequently, Larry Raymond defeated Mayor Tara for reelection. 172 Once
in office, Mayor Raymond issued an open letter, advising local Somalis to tell
their friends and relatives to stop coming to Lewiston. Although the letter
praised city staff and residents for their efforts on behalf of the new arrivals and
assured the Somalis that the city would continue to accommodate current resi-
dents, the letter ended on a harsh note: "'We have been overwhelmed and have
responded valiantly. Now we need breathing room. Our city is maxed out
physically, financially and emotionally."' 73
Many Somalis in Lewiston perceived this letter, which came from the city's
chief elder, as a warning that their people were not welcome. In an open letter
of their own, Somali elders described Mayor Raymond as "an ill-informed
leader who is bent towards bigotry" and indicated that he would be to blame if
members of the community saw the letter as a license to attack Somalis. 74 In-
deed, the mayor's letter sparked reactions from members of the community
opposed to the presence of the Somalis, who until that time had remained
largely silent. As Steve Hochstadt, a history professor at Bates College and a
member of the Holocaust Human Rights Center, stated:
[I]t's not surprising that there would be some people who would seize
upon a statement like this to give voice to sentiments that were beyond
the bounds of civility even a few days ago .... And that's one of the
things that makes it so troubling because ... it gives permission to a
kind of divisiveness that, frankly, we as a society have worked so hard
over the last four or five decades to overcome.1
75
Hostility towards the Somalis grew as city administrators undertook to meet
their needs for housing, health care, jobs, and education. When a white su-
premacist group from Ohio, World Church of the Creator, decided to organize
a hate rally in downtown Lewiston in 2003, city administrators prepared for the
worst.
176
171. Interview with Phil Nadeau, supra note 154.
172. David Conerty-Marin, Refugees Making Lewiston Next Stop, ME. SUNDAY TELE-
GRAM (Portland, Me.), June 17, 20o, at LA.
173. Kelley Bouchard, Closing the Door: Mayor's Request Disconcerts Somalians, PORT-
LAND PRESS HERALD (Portland, Me.), Oct. 5, 2002, at 1A.
174. Kelley Bouchard, Somalis Denounce Lewiston's Mayor; Accusing Laurier Raymond
of Bigotry, Elders Call on Him To Apologize and Retract His Recent Letter, PORT-
LAND PRESS HERALD (Portland, Me.), Oct. 12, 2002, at 1A.
175. Meredith Goad, Somalis, Coalition Want Federal Review of Lewiston; They Plan To
Ask the Justice Department To Ensure That City Programs Do Not Discriminate,
PORTLAND PRESS HERALD (Portland, Me.), Oct. 1O, 2002, at LA.
176. Kelley Bouchard, Security To Be Tight for Lewiston Rallies; Concrete Barriers and
Metal Detectors Will Be Used, and Random Searches Are Possible, PORTLAND PRESS
HERALD (Portland, Me.), Jan. 1o, 2003, at 1A.
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This time, however, Maine's insularity worked in the Somalis' favor.' 7
Alarmed by the presence of "racists from away" and the international news me-
dia covering the event, community leaders chose to send a different message.
The day of the hate rally in downtown Lewiston, which an estimated thirty-two
Lewiston residents attended, a peace rally in support of the Somalis, organized
by the Many & One Coalition, was held in the Merrill Gymnasium at Bates Col-
lege in Lewiston, and approximately 4500 people attended, including Governor
Baldacci, State Attorney General Steven Rowe, and Maine's two U.S. Senators,
Olympia Snowe and Susan Collins.'Ts Former Lewiston Mayor John Jenkins, the
city's first African-American mayor, was Master of Ceremonies. Mayor Ray-
mond, who was vacationing in Florida, was ridiculed; many people at the rally
had posters asking "Where's Mayor Raymond?," proclaiming "Everyone Hates
Raymond," or designating empty chairs as "Reserved for Mayor Raymond." 79
Mark Schlotterbeck, leader of the Many & One Coalition, said, "'We've all come
together to say whether you're gay or straight or whether you have this ability or
disability, either you're this color, or that color or this religion or that, we say
this will be our community.'"'"° State Attorney General Steven Rowe spoke di-
rectly to the white supremacists: "'I have a message for these hate mongers. You
are wasting your time here."".a' Although some community groups chose to
boycott the event because they felt it had been appropriated by the radical left
and by the gay-lesbian movement,"s2 the national media coverage portrayed the
event at Bates College as a victory for tolerance and moderation.'
Two years later, an act of religious intolerance met with a similar commu-
nity response, although on a much smaller scale. In July 2006, when Brent Mat-
thews rolled the frozen head of a pig, an animal considered unclean in Islam,
into the local mosque during evening prayer, he was arrested and charged with
desecrating a place of worship.1s4 A few days later, Lewiston residents held a
solidarity rally in the city's Kennedy Park to show support for the Muslim
community.'aS At the rally, Rabbi Hillel Katzir, speaking on behalf of the Lewis-
177. See supra note 155 and accompanying text.
178. Finnegan, supra note 13. These events are captured in Ziad Hamzeh's award-
winning documentary, THE LETTER, supra note 15.
179. See THE LETTER, supra note 15.
18o. Bouchard et al., Two Worlds Collide, supra note 17, at iA.
181. Id.
182. Interview with Phil Nadeau, supra note 154.
183. See Finnegan, supra note 13; THE LETTER, supra note 15.
184. Katie Zezima, A Lone Man's Stunt Raises Broader Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 5, 2006,
at A16.
185. David Hench, Rally Takes Stand Against Hatred: Lewiston Speakers Urge About i5o
People To Fight Slurs and 'Jokes' Like Those Hurled at Local Muslims, PORTLAND
PRESS HERALD (Portland, Me.), July 13, 2006, at Al.
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ton-Auburn Interfaith Association, told the group that "'[ilf any one group is
threatened, if any one group lives in fear, then there is no telling who will be the
next target. It must stop here. It must stop now. ' 1,8 6
B. Current Efforts To Integrate the Somalis
Over seven years have passed since the Somalis first arrived in Lewiston.
Government officials and social service providers, wary of media and scholarly
attention, have worked hard to integrate approximately 3ooo African Muslims
from Somalia into an insular city in one of the whitest states in the Union.8 7
Rates of unemployment within the Somali community remain high, particu-
larly for women with children, and job prospects are low.' In 2007, the Deputy
City Administrator estimated that, not counting women with children, the eld-
erly or disabled, unemployment hovered around 5o%."s9 A 2oo8 study by the
Maine Department of Labor found that while the percentage of Somalis with
consistent employment was 39.7%, the percentage with stable employment was
only 9.9%.19' By 2oo6, a total of 1963 Somalis had registered for public assis-
tance.19 As the Deputy City Administrator underscored in his report, Lewiston
no longer has an industrial base to support an unskilled population, and there
are few unskilled jobs in reasonable proximity to Lewiston.' 92
Today, many of the Somali men and women who entered the United States
as refugees and were part of the first wave to relocate to Lewiston between 2001
and 2003 are technically eligible to apply for U.S. citizenship.' 93 In the summer
of 2007, when I began this research, no single agency in Lewiston, governmental
or otherwise, had assumed responsibility for providing comprehensive citizen-
ship services. Catholic Charities Maine, which opened an office in Lewiston to
provide the Somalis with resettlement services, including job training, housing,
186. Id.
187. Martin, supra note 152.
188. NADEAU, supra note 14, at 3.
189. Id.
190. AMANDA K. RECTOR, AN ANALYSIS OF THE EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS OF SOMALI
IMMIGRANTS TO LEwISTON FROM 2001 THROUGH 2006 at 12 (2oo8), available at
http://www.maine.gov/labor/lmis/pdf/Lewiston%2oMigrant%2oReport.pdf.
191. Id. at 6.
192. NADEAU, supra note 14, at 4-5, 38.
193. Under U.S. law, a person admitted to the United States with refugee status be-
comes eligible to apply for "adjustment of status" to lawful permanent resident
(LPR) a year and a day after admission to the United States. Special rollback rules
for refugees who have adjusted status to lawful permanent resident treat their
residency as beginning on the date of their initial arrival in the United States, and
thus allow them to apply for citizenship five years after their admission to the
United States as refugees. 8 C.F.R. § 209.1(e) (2006).
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and health care, is located in Lewiston City Hall and works closely with city
administrators. 19 4 Several of the Catholic Charities caseworkers are Somali. 95
Yet, while Catholic Charities provides a full range of resettlement services, 96
most funding from the U.S. State Department's Office of Refugee Resettlement
(ORR) only applies during a refugee's first five years in the United States. 97
Thus, at the very point that a refugee became eligible to apply for U.S. citizen-
ship, Catholic Charities had been closing its files unless it could move them to
another grant9 8 Since that time, it has hired Hassan Adan, a Somali outreach
coordinator, to work with the elderly community on access to citizenship is-
sues.
99
Each weekday, the LAE provides English for Speakers of Other Languages
(ESOL) classes, tutoring, and continuing education courses. 00 It has also regu-
larly offered a citizenship class, which Hassan Adan, the Catholic Charities out-
reach coordinator, taught during the summer of 2008. ILAP, located in Port-
land, performs immigration intakes once or twice a month in Lewiston in
coordination with the LAE, offering free or low-cost immigration and citizen-
194. See Nadeau, The Somalis of Lewiston, supra note 19, at 112-13; Meeting with Refu-
gee Services, Catholic Charities of Lewiston, Lewiston City Hall (June 12, 2007)
[hereinafter Meeting with Refugee Services] (meeting with staff to discuss reset-
tlement and other services provided to Somali community in Lewiston and to ex-
plore possibility of organizing naturalization workshop in collaboration with
ILAP and LAE before fee increase in July); Catholic Charities Maine's Refugee
Services, http://www.ccmain.org/infophp?info-id=73 (last visited Mar. 22, 2009)
(describing resettlement services provided and indicating the location of Lewiston
office at Lewiston City Hall); E-mail from Arian Giantris, Assistant Program Dir.,
Catholic Charities Refugee Servs., to Lauren Gilbert, Assoc. Professor of Law, St.
Thomas Univ. (June 18, 2007, 11:12:24 EST) (on file with the Yale Law & Policy Re-
view) (discussing the author's visit to Catholic Charities of Lewiston and explor-
ing the feasibility of coordinating naturalization workshop).
195. Interview with G.T., supra note 5o; Interview with H.S., Outreach Coordinator,
Catholic Charities, in Lewiston, Me. (July 23, 20o8) [hereinafter Interview with
H.S.] (on file with author); E-mail from Ismail Ahmed to Lauren Gilbert, Assoc.
Professor of Law, St. Thomas Univ. (July 4, 2008, 7:46:o9 EST) (on file with the
Yale Law & Policy Review).
196. See Nadeau, The Somalis of Lewiston, supra note 19, at 112-13.
197. 45 C.F.R. § 400.152(b) (20o6) (stating that, except for naturalization preparation
services, the state may not provide services under this section for longer than sixty
months); Meeting with Refugee Services, supra note 194.
198. Meeting with Refugee Services, supra note 194.
199. E-mail from Arian Giantris, Program Dir., Catholic Charities Refugee Servs., to
Lauren Gilbert, Assoc. Professor of Law, St. Thomas Univ. (July 9, 20o8, 15:32:45
EST) (on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review).
200. Interview with Anne Kemper, Dir., Lewiston Adult Educ. Ctr., in Lewiston, Me.,
(June 7, 2007) [hereinafter Interview with Anne Kemper] (on file with the Yale
Law & Policy Review).
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ship legal services to eligible immigrants and refugees. Its Executive Director,
Beth Stickney, has raised concerns, however, that many Somalis who satisfy the
residency requirements for citizenship do not have the necessary English lan-
guage skills to pass the naturalization test, despite the fact that many are en-
rolled in ESOL classes."' A number of Somali self-help groups, including
women's groups and mutual assistance associations, have been started as well to
address the Somalis' unique needs in a culturally sensitive way.
In 2007, the National Civic League named Lewiston as one of its ten All
America Cities. The award is given out to those cities that "symbolize the spirit
of grassroots democracy and problem-solving."" 2 The winners were selected for
their ability to effectively engage a broad cross-section of the community in col-
laborative community problem-solving leading to concrete results. 3 Lewiston
was recognized for various initiatives, including its Lots to Gardens program,
through which urban lots have been transformed into sustainable urban gar-
dens that improve access to fresh food for at-risk populations, particularly the
Somalis. 0 4
Nonetheless, despite countless success stories, Somali activists in Lewiston
caution against exaggerating the city's accomplishments or ignoring the obsta-
cles to full participation that still exist. 0 5 Many of these are intergroup barriers
between the dominant white culture and the Somali community. Other barri-
ers, however, are intragroup barriers within the Somali community, including
separatist tendencies, clan rivalries, subordination of women, and discrimina-
tion against minority clans.
C. Barriers to Integration
1. Intergroup Barriers to Somali Integration
Despite the welcome they have received from many members of the Lewis-
ton community, Somalis continue to face discrimination and harassment from
Lewiston residents, including both private individuals and some government
officials. Khadra Jama, a Somali student activist at the local community college
and the keynote speaker on World Refugee Day 2008, described in her address
various incidents that she had personally experienced, including having a resi-
201. E-mail from Judith Southworth, supra note 33.
202. National Civic League, 2007 All America City Award Winners Announced,




205. Interview with Ismail Ahmed, supra note 12; Interview with E.V., supra note 12;
Telephone Interview with F.M., in Minneapolis, Minn., July 26, 2008 [hereinafter
Telephone Interview with F.M.] (on file with author).
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dent yell at her: "Take that rag off your head!"2"6 Khadra, a young woman who
wears a full hijab, later told me in an interview that she had been called a "nig-
ger" at least three times and had people yell at her to "go back where [she] came
from. '20 7 When she organized an event at her college on Women and Islam,
someone wrote on the poster, "Remember 9/l. '°
When Brent Matthews rolled a frozen pig's head into the local mosque in
the summer of 2006, city officials portrayed this incident as the isolated actions
of a disturbed man, charging him with a hate crime for desecrating a house of
worship. 9 Yet, less than a year later on April 11, 2007, Lewiston again attracted
media attention when a middle school student threw a piece of Easter ham onto
a table where Somali Muslim youngsters were gathered, thus reopening wounds
that had only recently begun to heal.2 "
Incidents of racism and bigotry are not limited to private individuals, how-
ever, as Mayor Raymond's Open Letter to the Somali community so clearly
demonstrated. While city administrators have worked hard to incorporate So-
mali residents into the life of the community, some elected officials have con-
tinued to demonstrate resistance to their presence in Lewiston and their full
participation in community affairs. For example, in 2007, when Mayor Laurent
Gilbert and several members of the City Council attempted to amend the order
establishing a Downtown Neighborhood Task Force to allow participation by
residents of Lewiston as well as registered voters, it met with community resis-
tance.2 ' The Mayor advocated for the appointment of Ismail Ahmed, at that
time a Somali cultural skills trainer with Catholic Charities of Lewiston. Gilbert
indicated that it was important to have a Somali serve on the Task Force as a
representative of the neighborhood, emphasizing that Ahmed was in the proc-
ess of applying for citizenship. 12 However, one resident, Elizabeth O'Brien,
stated that immigrants should care enough to be registered voters in order to
get involved."3 After a series of votes and motions to reconsider, including an
initial vote in which one member of the City Council stormed out after the
mayor indicated that his abstention would be counted as a "no" vote, the pro-
206. Khadra Jama, Keynote Speech on World Refugee Day, Lewiston, Me. (June 20,
2008) (on file with the Yale Law & Policy Review).
207. Interview with Khadra Jama, in Lewiston, Me. (July 10, 2008) (on file with the
Yale Law & Policy Review).
208. Id.
209. Zezima, supra note 184.
210. Jerry Harkavy, Somalis' Influx into Maine Milltown Raises Tensions, COLUMBUS
DISPATCH, May 13, 2007, at loA; see also Judge Tosses School Official's Fox Lawsuit,
PRESS ATLANTIC CITY, June 5, 2oo8, at D6.
211. Lewiston City Council Meeting Minutes (May 15, 2007), http://www.ci
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posed amendment was defeated by a vote of 2-3, because it did not receive the
required four affirmative votes needed to pass.' 4
This incident exemplifies the interplay between community-based norms
and national legal norms and the different layers of citizenship that can exist
within a particular community. Although Ismail Ahmed demonstrated a com-
mitment to civic citizenship and participation in local affairs, his lack of na-
tional citizenship became a structural impediment to his full civic engagement.
Several Lewiston residents, including elected members of the City Council, took
the position that membership on the Downtown Neighborhood Task Force
should be limited to "registered voters," thus barring him from participating. 15
The City Council's actions arguably constituted discrimination based on
alienage, with "registered voter" serving as a proxy for "U.S. citizen." Although
several U.S. Supreme Court decisions in the early 1970s found that state and lo-
cal laws that discriminated against noncitizens were subject to strict scrutiny
under equal protection analysis," 6 later decisions carved out a "public func-
tions" exception, permitting states to pass laws barring noncitizens from par-
ticipating in state government and the democratic process. 17 As the Supreme
Court wrote in Cabell v. Chavez-Salido:
The exclusion of aliens from basic governmental processes is not a
deficiency in the democratic system but a necessary consequence of the
community's process of self-definition. Self-government, whether direct
or through representatives, begins by defining the scope of the com-
munity of the governed and those of the governors as well: Aliens are by
definition those outside of this community."'
Such alienage classifications, a reflection of community norms reinforced by
federal law, send a powerful message to noncitizens that, unless and until they
naturalize, they will not be considered full members. 19
214. Id.
215. Subsequently, the mayor appointed Ahmed's sister, Zamzam Mohamud, a natu-
ralized U.S. citizen, to the Task Force, as well as Adila Mohammed Aceto, an Afri-
can-American Muslim. Interview with Ismail Ahmed, supra note 12.
216. See, e.g., In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 721-22 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S.
634, 642 (1973); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72 (1971).
217. See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 445 (1982) (noting that California's pro-
bation officers, like the state troopers in Foley, "sufficiently partake of the sover-
eign's power to exercise coercive force over the individual that they may be lim-
ited to citizens"); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 75-76 (1979) (stating that
"public school teachers may be regarded as performing a task 'that go[es] to the
heart of representative government"'); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 297 (1978)
(holding that the "police function fulfills a most fundamental obligation of gov-
ernment to its constituency").
218. Cabell, 454 U.S. at 439-40 (emphasis added).
219. For a thoughtful discussion of alienage law in the United States, see LINDA Bos-
NIAK, THE CITIZEN AND THE ALIEN 37-76 (2006).
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Discrimination against Somalis by government officials in Lewiston has
largely been limited to local elected officials responding to their constituents. In
this particular instance, Lewiston's City Council chose to reaffirm a community
norm limiting participation on the task force to U.S. citizens. Whether this was
done to exclude Ismail Ahmed, an outspoken Somali activist, or to reinforce a
particular perspective on Lewiston's collective identity (or both) is unclear. This
example does, however, underscore the potentially transformative power of
citizenship. By naturalizing, Ahmed and other Somalis in Lewiston could be-
come constituents and claim their right to full membership, giving them both
the power of the ballot and arguably a greater stake in the policy-making proc-
ess.
My research revealed, however, that many Somalis in Lewiston who are eli-
gible for citizenship have not chosen to naturalize. A significant number are
technically eligible, having resided in the United States for the requisite five
years, but do not possess the literacy skills needed to pass the English-language
and American-civics portions of the exam.22° Others cannot afford to pay the
exorbitant fees. Others face additional legal obstacles, such as the good moral
character requirement in the statute. Many others, however, while satisfying the
various requirements, choose not to naturalize." '
During my interviews in Lewiston and Auburn, I asked the Somalis with
whom I spoke about both the importance of U.S. citizenship to the Somali
community, as well as what they saw as the major obstacles to citizenship. Many
of the Somalis I interviewed indicated that the principle value of becoming a
citizen was that it would allow them to obtain a U.S. passport to travel back to
Somalia to visit with family and maintain their cultural connections with their
homeland."' Others saw in U.S. citizenship the security of knowing that they
could not be deported, in light of increasingly harsh immigration laws.223 Eld-
erly Somalis, who face some of the greatest obstacles, saw it as a way to maintain
their eligibility for public benefits.2 4 Still other Somalis saw becoming a U.S.
citizen as the final step in a process, and getting a U.S. passport as a source of
great pride. 5 Yet according to one Somali student leader, many long-time law-
ful permanent residents with no interest in returning to Somalia saw no real
value in becoming a U.S. citizen." 6 Moreover, few people specifically men-
220. Interview with Ismail Ahmed, supra note 12; Interview with G.T., supra note 50;
Interview with H.S., supra note 195; Interview with I.R., supra note 141; E-mail
from Judith Southworth, supra note 33.
221. Interview with D.W., supra note 50.
222. Interview with Ismail Ahmed, supra note 12; Interview with D.W., supra note 50;
Interview with G.T., supra note 50.
223. Interview with Ismail Ahmed, supra note 12.
224. Interview with H.S., supra note 195.
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tioned the importance of U.S. citizenship to full civic engagement.2 7 Most So-
malis who chose to naturalize were doing so largely for what Alex Aleinikoff
would characterize as "instrumental reasons. "22s
Indeed, when asked whether it was correct to presume that integration was
a desirable goal for most Somalis, this same student said she personally resisted
defining integration as the goal. 9 Rather, her goal was to be a Somali in an
American context, not just a passive recipient of acculturation but someone
choosing which Somali cultural practices to keep and which to abandon, and
which American practices to accept and which to reject. 3 ° At the same time, she
also volunteered that she was concerned about the creation of ethnic enclaves in
Lewiston, where Somalis could live and work and pray with very little interac-
tion with the majority community.23'
Hiroshi Motomura has recommended that the United States extend the
benefits of U.S. citizenship to lawful residents during the period prior to their
eligibility for naturalization. 32 He argues that treating new lawful immigrants as
Americans in waiting will further their successful integration into American so-
ciety. 33 Under his "immigration as transition" model, Motomura would no
227. Two important exceptions were F.M. and E.V. F.M., a naturalized U.S. citizen and
practicing Muslims came to the United States from Somalia in 1981 on a student
visa and moved with his wife to Lewiston in 2002, believing that he and his wife, a
social worker, could contribute to the Somalis' resettlement process in Lewiston.
They moved to Minnesota in 2006, largely frustrated by the obstacles he had en-
countered in Lewiston to the Somalis' full participation in the life of the commu-
nity. At the time of writing, F.M. was running his own interpreting and transla-
tion business in Minneapolis and was considering pursuing an advanced degree in
anthropology. Despite the frustrations he encountered in Lewiston, he explicitly
embraced the "American dream" and argued that America's immigrant heritage
was broad enough to accommodate Somali Muslims. Telephone Interview with
F.M., supra note 205. E.V., a Somali Muslim who works as an interpreter in the
L/A (Auburn/ Lewiston) area, spoke primarily of obstacles to integration within
the Somali community in the L/A area. Yet, despite these obstacles, she is a natural-
ized U.S. citizen, and an active member of various organizations. Interview with
E.V., supra note 12. E.V. is also the mother of two school-age children, a girl and a
boy, and constantly reminds her daughter, in particular, that, despite what she is
told by other Somalis, she is capable of becoming anything to which she sets her
mind. Id.
228. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Between Principles and Politics: U.S. Citizenship Policy,
in FROM MIGRANTS TO CITIZENS 119, 132-34 (T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Douglas
Klusmeyer eds., 2000).
229. Interview with D.W., supra note 50.
230. Interview with D.W., supra note 50; Interview with G.T., supra note 50.
231. Interview with D.W., supra note 50.
232. HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING: THE LOST STORY OF IMMIGRA-
TION AND CITIZENSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 13 (2006).
233. Id.
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doubt encourage the participation of Ismail Ahmed on Lewiston's Downtown
Neighborhood Task Force, particularly as someone in the process of becoming
a U.S. citizen. At the same time, he might also have concerns about members of
the Somali community who are technically eligible for citizenship but who have
not taken the steps necessary to become U.S. citizens. Motomura argues that if
national citizenship is undervalued, then other connections of "religion, race,
class and other groupings" will begin to matter more, resulting in what political
philosopher Michael Walzer describes as a "thousand petty fortresses. 234
2. Intragroup Barriers to Somali Integration
While many of the barriers to the Somalis' full integration into Lewiston's
social fabric thus are external, others can be attributed to intragroup barriers
within the Somali community itself. The major intragroup barriers to full civic
participation include the following: separatist tendencies by clan elders and
among conservative Somalis, ongoing clan rivalries, subordination of women,
and discrimination against minority and low-caste clans.
a. Separatism or Religious Pluralism?
As discussed in the previous section, the Somalis I interviewed gave various
reasons why many Somalis in Lewiston were not pursuing U.S. citizenship. One
of the reasons given by educated Somalis, in particular, was resistance to inte-
gration into the American mainstream.235 From a multiculturalist perspective,
the desire not to assimilate and thus to lose ones cultural and religious identity
is a legitimate choice that the host society should respect and accommodate.
Many Somali elders view assimilation into the American mosaic as a threat to
the very survival of the Somali people. To a large extent, Somali elders chose to
relocate to Lewiston from major resettlement cities like Atlanta, Columbus,
Memphis, and New Orleans because they did not want their people, and par-
ticularly their children, assimilated to African-American or the majority cul-
ture.23 6 The elders chose Lewiston because they believed that they could raise
their children and practice their religion in relative peace, free from unwanted
outside influences. 37
234. Id. (citing with approval MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF
PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 39 (1984)); see also infra note 342 and accompanying
text.
235. Interview with D.W., supra note 50.
236. Telephone Interview with F.M., supra note 205; see also Bouchard, A Thousand
Miles, supra note ii; Jones, supra note 146, at 65.
237. Bouchard, A Thousand Miles, supra note 11. Somali elders are a self-appointed
group of men who claim to speak for their community and who are recognized by
the Somali community and by each other as leaders. The Somali elders tend to be
older but not necessarily so. They also tend to represent more conservative ten-
dencies within the Somali community and particular majority clans. One Lewis-
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Some groups within the Somali community in Lewiston have worked hard
to maintain their religious and cultural identity, through what some scholars
would describe as the phenomenon of cultural reactivism, in which cultural and
religious values become more pronounced in the host society as a way to pre-
serve a refugee or immigrant group's shared identity.23 This has particularly
been the case with regard to elders from the local mosque, located on Lisbon
Street in downtown Lewiston, who represent more traditionalist tendencies
within the Somali community. When the founders of the mosque made an ex-
ecutive decision to close their new mosque to non-Muslims, despite the fact
that their original mosque had been open to non-Muslims, it sparked a bitter
response from many Lewiston residents, particularly from individuals who had
been supporters of the Somalis. Several supporters of the Somali community
had attended services at the original mosque, including Professor Heather
Lindkvist, Mark Schlotterbeck, a Christian missionary and head of the Many
and One Coalition, and Hillel Katzir, the local rabbi.23 9 Some of the mosque's
Executive Committee members expressed concern, however, with Christian
evangelization within the walls of the mosque, and so the Executive Committee
decided on a bright-line rule to exclude all non-Muslims rather than singling
out any particular group or individual. This was a difficult decision for the
mosque's leadership to make, resulting, as it did, in the exclusion of many indi-
ton official, when asked who the Somali elders in Lewiston were, described an
"elder" as a mythical, amorphous moving target. Interview with Phil Nadeau, su-
pra note 154. He described the challenges Lewiston officials faced and continue to
face in identifying both elders and leaders within the Somali community. In the
early days after the Somalis' arrival, literally every day Somali men would show up
and claim to be the leaders of their community. Each time, city officials would
conjecture that "[tihis must be the person." Id. They eventually concluded that
many of these individuals represented the different Somali clans and sub-clans.
Today, they recognize a leader as someone with high visibility within that com-
munity as well as someone whose credibility is not questioned. In their eyes, a
leader is identified based on both his or her ability to generate participation by
members of the community as well as by peoples' reaction to him or her when he
or she speaks. Id. A low negative response tends to indicate, from the perspective
of officials, that someone has achieved a leadership role within the community. Id.
238. SHACHAR, supra note lo, at 35-36. Indeed, the migration of Muslims to non-
Muslim countries is a relatively new development in the history of Muslim migra-
tion patterns. Historically, Muslim populations came under Christian rule largely
by conquest. Muslims in such circumstances saw it as their religious duty to emi-
grate to a Muslim country, since it was not believed possible to live a true Muslim
life under a non-Muslim government. LEWIS & CHURCHILL, supra note lo, at io.
In recent years, large Muslim populations have fled to or been resettled in non-
Muslim countries and have thus been faced with the new challenge of adapting to
or seeking accommodation from the host society. Id. at 94-95.
239. Interview with Heather Lindkvist, supra note 12.
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viduals who had worked hard to achieve the Somalis' acceptance within Lewis-
ton.,40
Many Somalis, however, see their collective identity as Muslims as critical
to overcoming the clan rivalries that historically have divided Somalis from
each other. In theory, at least, the mosque is a place where they can come to-
gether as one people. Indeed, it serves as the place where much of the social
networking within the Somali community occurs. A group of young women de-
scribed how Somalis will provide financial assistance to other Somalis in dis-
tress without question and without regard to clan identity. 4' Seeking a balance,
however, between group identity and participation in the broader community is
elusive given the broad array of Somali perspectives on the value of member-
ship in the broader community.
One of the areas where city officials have attempted to weave Somali Mus-
lims into Lewiston's social fabric has been in the area of local government.
While many Somali activists embrace this opportunity, some members of the
mosque's executive committee take the position that the Somali elders should
stay out of local affairs, except when they specifically affect the Somali commu-
nity.24 Minutes of a City Council meeting in which Ismail Ahmed, a Somali
Muslim, was asked to give the closing prayer revealed a fascinating back-story
that raises important questions about religious and multicultural accommoda-
tion in an increasingly diverse American community.4 3
In early 2008, in an attempt to incorporate the Somali elders into local gov-
ernment affairs, Mayor Gilbert invited the imam at the Lisbon Street mosque to
give the closing prayer at the Lewiston City Council meeting. Hillel Katzir, the
local rabbi, was to give the opening prayer. The elders initially rejected the
Mayor's request because the mosque's executive committee deemed it inappro-
priate for the imam or other mosque leaders to involve themselves in secular
affairs. ' " Days before the meeting, Mayor Gilbert went to the mosque in the
24o. Telephone Interview with F.M., supra note 205.
241. Interview with A.Z., B.Y., and C.X., supra note 12.
242. Interview with Ismail Ahmed, supra note 12; Telephone Interview with F.M., supra
note 205.
243. Lewiston City Council Meeting Minutes (Jan. 7, 2008), http://www.ci.lewiston
.me.us/council/minutes/2oo8/ol-o7-o8.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2009).
244. Interview with Ismail Ahmed, supra note 12. According to Muslim teachings, in a
Muslim state, there is no human legislative function. The legal function of the
state is to apply and enforce the divinely given law, known as the Shari'a or holy
law, which consists of the Qur'an, the hadiths, or traditions laid down by Mo-
hammed during his lifetime, and ijtihad, or authoritative interpretations of Is-
lamic law. LEwis & CHURCHILL, supra note lo, at 26-29. In most Muslim coun-
tries, there is thus no real separation between the secular and the religious.
Indeed, most recent constitutions in Muslim countries, although more secular in
tone, indicate that the Shari'a shall be a source or even the principal source of leg-
islation. Id. at 36. For many Muslims living in non-Muslim states, the idea of par-
ticipating in secular affairs remains fundamentally at odds with these teachings.
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dead of winter to attempt to talk to the imam but was not invited inside because
he is not Muslim. He discussed the issue with members of the Executive Com-
mittee on the sidewalk outside the mosque.2 45 While the leaders assured the
mayor they would reconsider his invitation, when the day of the meeting ar-
rived, the city still had not received a response from the mosque. The city then
asked Ismail Ahmed, a Somali activist, to deliver the prayer instead, and he re-
luctantly agreed. That night, according to Ahmed, members of the mosque's
Executive Committee attended the meeting and later praised him for his
prayer.' 46 According to a member of the mosque leadership familiar with this
incident, the Executive Committee had decided to send a representative to give
the closing prayer but had neglected to inform the City in time.2
47
There are different ways of interpreting this incident. Members of the host
community, including Mayor Gilbert and other government officials, might
reasonably view it as another example of Somali cultural separatism from local
affairs. Indeed, the mosque appears to have become the Somali community's
own petty fortress. Those Somali community activists who seek stronger ties
with the host community argue that Islam is more than just a religion; it is a
way of life, and the Somali community should be seeking a greater presence as
Muslims in Lewiston rather than isolating themselves within their religious
community.' 4 Yet, the desire of the mosque leadership to stay out of secular af-
fairs is also consistent with religious orthodoxy in other faiths and, indeed, with
one view of the Establishment Clause under which church and state should re-
main separate as a way to prevent the contamination of religion by the secular.
For example, in County ofAlleghany v. A. C.L. U.,2 49 part of the opposition to the
cr&he and menorah displays in Pittsburgh came from religious organizations,
including the National Council of Churches and the American Jewish Congress,
who believed their placement in front of city hall secularized and degraded im-
portant religious symbols. 5 The Mayor of Lewiston in this Catholic town may
have been signaling to its Jewish and Muslim residents that they too were full
members of the community. He was willing to dilute certain civic-religious
rituals in an effort to integrate the Somali leaders into community affairs. His
actions, however, raised important questions about the role religion has come
to play in public life in Lewiston and whether Lewiston is sending a."message of
245. LEwIs & CHURCHILL, supra note lo, at 36.
246. Interview with Ismail Ahmed, supra note 12.
247. Interview with H.S., supra note 195.
248. Interview with Ismail Ahmed, supra note 12.
249. County of Alleghany v. A.C.L.U., 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
250. Brief of American Jewish Committee et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respon-
dents at 20, County of Alleghany v. A.C.L.U., 492 U.S. 573 (1989) (No. 87-2050),
1988 WL 1026123.
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pluralism and freedom to choose ones own beliefs" or symbolically endorsing
religion over the secular.2"'
Public education is one of the areas in which the Somalis have sought and
received religious accommodation from the government. Heather Lindkvist, an
anthropologist at Bates College, has described how, over the last several years,
the public schools have struggled with issues of how to accommodate the Soma-
lis' religious beliefs and practices." 2 The public school system has been very so-
licitous of the Somali community and their religious practices, hiring a cultural
liaison from the Somali community to achieve solutions satisfactory to both the
more conservative Somalis and the public schools.25 3 It adopted a dress code al-
lowing the use of headwear for religious purposes,25 4 permitted Muslim girls to
put on sweatpants under their hijab for gym class, 5 allowed students to opt out
of gym class during Ramadan,25 6 accommodated Muslims' dietary restrictions
in the school lunch program, and provided special accommodations to avoid
physical contact between boys and girls. They also have allowed Muslim stu-
dents to leave for Friday prayer during Ramadan, although they discourage this
absence as disruptive of the school's educational mission. 57
Lindkvist acknowledges the education literature that suggests that accom-
modating students by allowing them to opt out of certain school activities can
reinforce a marginalized status for students within the school and negatively in-
fluence integration."'8 She also acknowledges that what it means to be a "good
Somali" or "good Muslim" is highly contested. 5 9 She describes one incident in
which two Somali students came to blows when one female student dressed in a
traditional head scarf reprimanded the other for wearing a loose head scarf with
American-style clothes. 6 ' Nonetheless, she concludes that the Lewiston public
school system's approach is consistent with a progressive model of education
that provides access to education for students from diverse social and cultural
backgrounds, allowing them to feel welcome and to thrive in a public school
setting."' Despite the concerns these examples raise, the likely alternative is ar-
251. 492 U.S. at 634.
252. Lindkvist, supra note 20, at 164.
253. Id. at 166.
254. Id. at 175-77.
255. Id. at 182-86.
256. Id. at 19o.
257. Id. at 189.
258. Id. at 187.
259. Id. at 194.
260. Id. at 172. Lindkvist describes how the student's mother already had been criti-
cized for allowing her daughters to wear clothing that did not conform to Somali
community values. Id.
261. Id. at 195.
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guably worse: Somali Muslim families opting for education at private religious
schools. On the other hand, refusal to accommodate the Somali elders might
have precipitated a showdown within the Somali community and a break be-
tween more traditional Somalis and those seeking fuller integration into Lewis-
ton.
b. Ongoing Clan Rivalries
Somalis and experts alike emphasize that a Somali's most important iden-
tity has traditionally been his or her tribe or clan.262 Clan membership is thus
yet another form of group identity. Yet from the perspective of many of the per-
sons whom I interviewed, it has been a destructive force in Somalia, in the refu-
gee camps, and in the town of Lewiston.
The Somali people are divided into two major groups: the Sab and the
Samale. The Sab people of southern Somalia include the Digil and Rahanweyn
and are more sedentary with a bias towards cultivation. The Samale people
trace their descent patrilineally, back to four major clans, the Dir, Isaaq,
Hawiye, and Darod. The Samale are primarily pastoral nomads, spread
throughout the land.263
The major clans are further broken down into subclans, including both
higher caste subclans of the Samale, like the Ogaden, the largest subclan of the
Darod, who have a major presence in Lewiston, and lower caste minority clans
like the Tumal, Midgan, Yibir, and Galgala.264 Minority clans like the Tumal,
who are represented in the L/A area, are considered inferior by the Samale
clans, not allowed to marry outside their clan, limited to certain occupations,
and subject to discrimination by other clans.26 5 Some ethnic Somalis from the
major Samale clans argue that the minority clans are looked down upon in
Lewiston because many are not fully embracing Somali culture and Muslim
values. Discrimination against low-caste clans also appears to be rooted in the
origins stories of the Somali people.
The Samale clans are believed to be descended from a common ancestor.
Any clan that does not belong to one of these four "noble" nomadic clan fami-
262. See AYAAN HIRSI ALI, INFIDEL 3-17 (2008); LEWIS, supra note 147, at 166; U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, & LABOR, SOMALIA:
PROFILE OF ASYLUM CLAIMS AND COUNTRY CONDITIONS 2 (2000), available at
http://www.asylumlaw.org/docs/somalia/usdosoo-somalia-profile.pdf; Roland
Marchal, Islamic Political Dynamics in the Somali Civil War Before and After Sep-
tember ii, in ISLAMISM AND ITS ENEMIES IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 114, 131 (Alex de
Waal ed., 2004); Scruggs, supra note 34, at 227.
263. Scruggs, supra note 34, at 228.
264. HOME OFFICE BORDER & IMMIGRATION AGENCY (U.K.), OPERATIONAL GUIDANCE
NOTE: SOMALIA, 2008, at 3.6, available at http://www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/
sitecontent/documents/policyandlaw/countryspecificasylumpolicyogns.
265. Id. at 3.6.2; Interview with J.Q., Auburn, Me. (July 2, 2008) (on file with author).
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lies is considered inferior.266 One young woman with whom I spoke, for exam-
ple, explained that ethnic Somalis discriminated against the Midgan clan be-
cause, generations ago, a Midgan forefather ate a dead animal in the desert
(considered haram, or forbidden, in Islam) in order to survive, then refused to
regurgitate it when he reached safety.26 7 The Somali Bantu, as discussed further
below, are largely outside the major clan system, descendants of slaves who
Arab traders brought to Somalia in the nineteenth century. 6 The Somali clan
system is thus marked by deeply rooted hereditary inequalities that are incon-
sistent with core U.S. constitutional values of liberty and equality.
Despite efforts under the regime of Siad Barre during the 1970s to do away
with the clan system and to establish a national Somali identity, in the end, Siad
Barre played on these rivalries to maintain himself in power and, in so doing, is
said to have provoked the civil war that led to the destruction of the Somali
state.269 Similarly, despite efforts by Somali elders in Lewiston to project a
united Somali identity to the outside world-and while it is considered taboo
for Somalis to discuss clan conflicts to outsiders-my research revealed the per-
sistence of clan rivalries in the L/A area which threaten to divide the community
and to reinforce deep social inequalities. 7° The importance of clan membership
is indoctrinated from early childhoodY This essay from a Somali student at
Edward Little High School in Auburn, prepared as part of a school project in
the Spring of 2008, powerfully underscores the clan tensions that persist in the
L/A area:
When I first got here I learned that Somalian [sic] weren't just one
kind of people, one country, they were separated as tribes. The tribes
are divided up like a tree, you have the trees then the limbs then
branches then leafs. ... If you are Somalian, when you're born you
take the tribe name of your father just like your last name, so mine is
266. OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, IMMIGRATION & NATU-
RALIZATION SERV., WHETHER SOMALI CLAN MEMBERSHIP MAY MEET THE DEFI-
NITION OF MEMBERSHIP IN A PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP UNDER THE IMMIGRA-
TION AND NATIONALITY ACT, IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 1-2
(1993).
267. Interview with A.Z., B.Y., and C.X., supra note 12.
268. CATHERINE BESTEMAN, UNRAVELING SOMALIA: RACE, VIOLENCE, AND THE LEG-
ACY OF SLAVERY 49 (1999).
269. LEWIS, supra note 147, at 262-63.
270. This was one of the few areas of research where the author encountered consider-
able resistance from Somalis. Even progressive Somalis, while acknowledging the
importance of clan identity and its role as a divisive force within Lewiston, were
reluctant to identify particular clan divisions. Most of the information on this
topic came from scholarly articles on Somalia and from young people in their
teens or early twenties. See Interview with A.Z., B.Y., and C.X., supra note 12; In-
terview with D.W., supra note 50.
271. Interview with A.Z., B.Y., and C.X., supra note 12.
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Hawiya.... The Somalis that live here in the U.S. won't talk to each
other until they know your tribe. Which tribe you're from depends
where they'll place you in their ladder of friends. In L/A, Maine most of
the Somali's [sic] are from the Darood tribe.... Most of the girls here
become friends when their moms are friends, but there are some peo-
ple that don't care about the tribe thing... . Right now the war that is
going on [in Somalia] is because of the tribe thing, every tribe wants to
take control of the government, because they think they can do a good
job on it, especially two of the biggest tribes, Hawiya and Darood. At
home Somali people often listens [sic] to BBC Somali to follow the lat-
est news about the country. Most of the time I'm hearing about things
that my tribe has done.... When I was new here I was scared to tell
what my tribe is.... After sitting down and talking about it to my
mom, she told me that my tribe isn't that bad. They are one of the
tribes that started the war but they had their reasons. She also told me
not to be ashamed of my tribe. Right now every time someone asks me
what my tribe is I tell it to them with my head up high. Of course I still
don't fit in perfectly, every time I meet some one the first thought that
comes to me is, do they hate you [sic] tribe? But I'm trying to push
those thoughts away and have fun in life.2 72
As this student essay underscores, even today in Maine, Somalis' clan member-
ship often determines their relationship to one another. In Lewiston, it is ru-
mored that one can not work for the city unless one belongs to particular tribes,
and that Somali city workers are hired as tokens to appease certain Somali eld-
ers.273 When Somali caseworkers deny benefits to other Somalis, their decisions
are often personalized, with the applicant accusing the caseworker of being per-
sonally responsible for the denial of benefits. 4
Furthermore, several people with whom I spoke reported that elders from
the various subclans frequently fight among themselves over who will be the
next imam or religious leader.2 75 There has been a high turnover of imams at the
mosque who are hired and fired by the mosque's executive committee. The
mosque on Lisbon Street, established soon after the first Somalis came to Lewis-
ton, reportedly was on its fourth imam. Although the mosque's executive
committee has made some attempt to achieve balance among the different
clans, there has been a tendency for the mosque to disproportionately represent
272. Fatima Hersi, Do I or Do I Not (Spring 20o8) (unpublished manuscript, on file
with the Yale Law & Policy Review); see also 'THEY WERE VERY BEAUTIFUL. SUCH
THINGS ARE.' XXV (Patricia Buck & Rachel Silver eds., 20o8) (describing the proc-
ess of gathering stories and compiling memoirs at Edward Little High School in
Auburn, Maine and at other locations from January through April 2008).
273. Interview with D.W., supra note 50.
274. Id.
275. Interview with Ismail Ahmed, supra note 12; Interview with A.Z., B.Y., and C.X.,
supra note 12.
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certain majority clans, particularly the Ogaden. A tension exists between the
imams' role as religious leaders and their roles as clan leaders, and one imam
left because he did not want to assume the role of clan leader.76
There appears to be a genuine tension in Islamic teachings and traditions
regarding the role of clan identity, which continues to pose grave challenges for
the Somalis, both in Somalia and the diaspora. On the one hand, loyalty to
one's kin is, according to traditional Islamic values, a basic moral obligation. In
many Muslim countries, kinship ties have survived in the form of the hamula,
an Arabic term defining "a group of people descended from a common ances-
tor."2 7 Muslims who fail to use positions of power or influence to benefit their
kin are seen as "failing in [their] social and moral duties." z7' At the same time,
the Somalis with whom I spoke emphasized that Mohammed also called on his
followers to put aside their tribal differences and to come together as one Mus-
lim people.27 9 Both traditional and more progressive Somali Muslims profess
that clan divisions are contrary to Islam and the teachings of Mohammed, but
Somalia's legacy of clan conflict continues to haunt the Somalis of Lewiston and
to stand in the way of true reconciliation.
c. "Oppression of Women by Women"
In the United States, Somali women and girls play an important symbolic
role as keepers of Somali cultural and religious values28 Although women can-
not serve on the mosque's executive committee, are not included among the
Somali elders, and must pray separately from men, many Somali women in
Lewiston have risen to positions of leadership and prominence within the city,
including Fatuma Hussein, the director of United Somali Women of Maine,
and Zamzam Mohamud, who now serves on the city's Downtown Neighbor-
hood Task Force."' Moreover, within the Muslim community, women serve
276. Interview with Ismail Ahmed, supra note 12; Interview with A.Z., B.Y., and C.X.,
supra note 12.
277. LEwIS & CHURCHILL, supra note io, at 194.
278. Id. at 3-4.
279. Interview with A.Z., B.Y., and C.X., supra note 12; see also PHILIP CARL SALZMAN,
CULTURE AND CONFLICT IN THE MIDDLE EAST 137-38 (2008) (describing how
Mohammed built on the tribal system of balanced opposition to create an inclu-
sive structure in which the tribes had a common God-given identity as Muslims
and a common enemy: the infidel).
280. See, e.g., Heather Marie Akou, Nationalism Without a Nation: Understanding the
Dress of Somali Women in Minnesota, in FASHIONING AFRICA: POWER AND THE
POLITICS OF DRESS 50, 50-63 (jean Allman ed., 2004) (discussing Somali women's
use of religious dress as a means of resistance and trend toward revivalism in the
Islamic world).
281. Interview with Ismail Ahmed, supra note 12; Interview with E.V., supra note 12; see
also United Somali Women of Maine, http://www.usofmaine.org (last visited Mar.
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important roles, not just as mothers and wives but as educators, administrators
and enforcers of Somali cultural and religious values.2s2
In Lewiston, most Somali women and girls wear some form of the veil as a
religious duty, as a symbol of the Somali community's collective identity, or, in
some cases, as a result of community or peer pressure. 83 Somali women in
Lewiston do not all agree over what their Muslim faith requires, with some
women wearing a full hijab, while others choose to wear only a headscarf.
Nonetheless, social control has come to play an important role within the Mus-
lim community in Lewiston, through what one Somali male described as the
"oppression of women by women. ' '284
As discussed above, Lindkvist describes an incident in her article in which
two female students exchanged blows at Lewiston High School after one stu-
dent, wearing the traditional headscarf and conservative clothing, criticized an-
other Somali student for not dressing in accordance with community norms.
The second student's mother had already been warned by other Somali women
against allowing her daughters to dress inappropriately. 85 Indeed, several indi-
viduals confirmed that there are a group of Somali women in Lewiston who are
both very religious and very educated who feel it is their duty to ensure that
Somali women conform to Somali religious and cultural norms, as defined by
the elders. 86 Somali women from the mosque will often go door to door
through the neighborhood, counseling other Somali women as to their respon-
sibilities as "good Muslims." '' 7 Indeed, as Lindkvist discusses in her piece, one
woman with whom she spoke said that the civil war in Somalia was Allah's pun-
ishment for the Somali people not being "good Muslims.""8 Another Somali
confirmed and the scholarly literature indicates that prior to the outbreak of
civil war in Somalia, many Somali women had dressed in Western clothes. The
transition to traditional Muslim attire was a response to the collapse of the So-
22, 2009) (describing the mission of the organization and Fatuma Hussein as the
founder and director).
282. Id.; see also Interview with C.X., supra note 12.
283. See, e.g., Lindkvist, supra note 20, at 169-74.
284. Interview with Ismail Ahmed, supra note 12. Ahmed underscored that many So-
mali cultural values are enforced by women against other women, including the
practice of female genital mutilation, which was carried out in Somalia and in the
refugee camps by women.
285. See Lindkvist, supra note 20, at 172.
286. Interview with Ismail Ahmed supra note 12; Interview with D.W., supra note 50;
Interview with I.R., supra note 141.
287. Interview with Ismail Ahmed, supra note 12.
288. See Lindkvist, supra note 20, at 173.
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mali State, the rise of fundamentalism, and the role of the hijab as a form of
protection from inter-clan violence. s9
Even in Lewiston, failure to conform to traditional Somali community val-
ues can be costly.2 90 In one reported case, when a Somali Bantu from Vermont
visited Lewiston wearing Bantu women's traditional attire, a colorful dress
which reveals the shoulder, the arms, and the legs, she was chased down the
streets of Lewiston by Somali women in full hijab who harassed her for wearing
Bantu clothing in the United States.2 91 This "oppression of women by women"
occurs even within the setting of adult education classes taught by Western
teachers, where peer pressure constitutes a powerful force for conformity. 9
Refusal to conform to community values can result not only in harassment
but also in social ostracism. A corollary of the centrality of clan membership as
an organizing principle is the important role of social networks as sources of
sustenance and support. For many Somalis, the protection of their clan became
the only means for their survival, first in Somalia during the civil war, then later
during their flight and in the refugee camps.2 93 Although social networks con-
tinue to play an important role in Lewiston, thus far they have not been effec-
tive as alternatives to state protection in cases involving domestic violence. 94
Several people reported that the worst offense that a Somali woman can commit
in Lewiston is to seek assistance from a women's shelter or from the police. 95
289. ALI, supra note 262, at 127-28; Akou, supra note 280, at 55-56; Interview with I.R.,
supra note 141.
290. Interview with Ismail Ahmed, supra note 12.
291. Interview with I.R., supra note 141.
292. See, e.g., Rachel Edith Silver, Negotiating New Lives: Using Somali Refugee
Women's Participation in an ESOL Program To Re-envision the Purposes of
Schooling in Transnational Times 161-69 (Apr. 8, 2005) (unpublished B.A. thesis,
Bates College) (on file with Bates College Library).
293. HORST, supra note 147, at 63.
294. One of the challenges faced by modern Muslims is how to deal with the problem
of domestic violence. The Qur'an explicitly allows a husband to beat his wife.
HOLY QUR'AN, supra note 7, at 4:34. While he should first "admonish her" to be a
better wife, the Qur'an also allows him to leave her bed or beat her. Id. Modern
scholars and religious leaders have struggled to reconcile that language with mod-
ern times. Many religious leaders take the position that the Qur'an permits hus-
bands to use force to discipline unruly wives. Yet even some of the most progres-
sive Muslims who oppose domestic violence seek to give meaning to the Qur'an's
language. For example, Jamal Badawi, the director of the Islamic Information
Foundation in Canada, has denounced domestic violence and yet argued that in
situations where a wife persists in disregarding her marital obligations, the hus-
band "may resort to another measure that may save the marriage ... more accu-
rately described as a gentle tap on the body." Asra Q. Nomani, Clothes Aren't the
Issue, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2006, at B1.
295. Interview with A.Z., B.Y., and C.X., supra note 12; Interview with Patricia Buck,
supra note 141; Interview with Heather Lindkvist, supra note 12.
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Yet, while Somali women who seek protection within their communities are of-
ten scolded for not being better wives, Somali women who go to the police or to
a women's shelter face social ostracism and the denial of the other benefits so-
cial networking provides9 6
Despite this grim picture, there are ways in which Somali women in Lewis-
ton are creating spaces to dialogue about the role of Somali Muslim women in
Western society. Many Somali women struggle with the question of how to be a
Somali woman in America. ESOL classes have served as a valuable forum for
such discussions. Despite the social control that takes place in the classroom
and in the broader society, many Somali women are single-parent heads of
households, confronted with the challenge of supporting families on their own.
Some of these women are divorced spouses from polygynous marriages that
were terminated before their ex-husbands could immigrate to the United
States.2 97 Many are dependent on the welfare system, including ex-spouses from
polygynous unions, women abandoned by their husbands, and still others who
left their husbands after deciding that they and their children were better off re-
lying on the state for support.29' Consequently, while subscribing to traditional
Somali values, many Somali women are adapting to a lifestyle far different than
the lives they knew in Somalia or the refugee camps. 99
Somali women, thus, are struggling to define their new roles and identities.
Some educated Somali women who do not share the traditional values of their
peers have chosen to move away from Lewiston, while others have chosen to
stay and work through these issues."' Some are dependent on their social net-
works.3"' To the extent that others have achieved a certain level of financial in-
dependence and autonomy, they have found that the social pressure to con-
form, while ever-present, is not overwhelming, and that this autonomy creates a
space where dialogue can occur about what it means to be a Somali-Muslim
woman in America. 02
296. Interview with A.Z., B.Y., and C.X., supra note 12; Interview with Patricia Buck,
supra note 141; Interview with Heather Lindkvist, supra note 12.
297. Patricia Buck & Rachel Silver, Becoming American in Time?: The Educational Im-
plications of Binary Discourse on Immigration in Advancing Democracy Through
Education, in U.S. INFLUENCE ABROAD AND DOMESTIC PRACTICES 49 (E. Doyle Ste-
vik & Bradley A.U. Levinson eds., 20o8).
298. Interview with D.W., supra note 50.
299. Patricia Buck, "You Better Say Your Prayers Before Prayers Are Said for You": Nego-
tiating and Regulating Gender Change, in EDUCATED FOR CHANGE?: GENDER,
SCHOOLING & FORCED MIGRATION IN THE LIVES OF SOMALI WOMEN (forthcom-
ing 2009) [hereinafter EDUCATED FOR CHANGE?].
300. Interview with A.Z., B.Y., and C.X. supra note 12; Interview with E.V., supra note
12.
301. Interview with A.Z., B.Y., and C.X., supra note 12.
302. Interview with E.V., supra note 12.
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d. Discrimination Against Minority and Low-Caste Clans
The persistence of clan rivalries in Lewiston has resulted in the subordina-
tion of minority and lower-caste clans and in their being denied access to lead-
ership positions within the Somali community. Nowhere is this more apparent
than in the treatment of the Somali Bantu, who were brought to Somalia as
slaves from other parts of Africa in the early nineteenth century, and who con-
tinue to face discrimination and harassment today.3 °3 In the early twentieth cen-
tury, after slavery was abolished, the Somali Bantus relocated to villages in
southern Somalia between the Shebelle and Juba Rivers, where they, like the Sab
clans, engaged largely in cultivation.3 ° 4 Unlike ethnic Somalis, who are taller,
lighter skinned, and have thinner bone structures and claim to be of Arab de-
scent, the Somali Bantus are darker skinned, more African in appearance, and
thus more easily singled out." 5
During the civil war in Somalia, entire Bantu villages were decimated, and
families were torn apart. Many of them became refugees in Kenya but contin-
ued to face persecution at the hands of the major clans. Finally, in 1999, the
United States offered refugee status to many of the Bantu people, but their ad-
mission to the United States was delayed by 9/11, and the first group of Bantu
refugees was not resettled in the United States until 2003. By 2005, many had
begun to make their way to Lewiston.
Despite efforts by Somali elders to project a united Somali identity, Bantu
Somalis in Lewiston describe disturbing instances of discrimination by other
Somalis.3" 6 Acts of racism and discrimination by ethnic Somalis towards the
Bantu are rampant in the school system and, according to Bantu leaders, occur
frequently within the broader Lewiston community. In a 2006 New Yorker
piece, one Somali Bantu describes the insults and racial slights from other So-
malis in Lewiston as unrelenting. He describes how other Somalis did not hesi-
tate to use the word "adoon," which means "slave," in describing the Bantus and
that when a friend went to the local mosque to pray, he was told to return with
six men to clean the mosque for free.3 7 These tendencies are reinforced in the
public schools, where ethnic Somali children teach white children Somali in-
sults against Bantu children.30 8
303. BESTEMEN, supra note 268, at 114-18.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 115-19 (describing how the ethnic Somalis link the Bantus' African appear-
ance to their identity as former slaves); see also LEWIS, supra note 147, at 4-5 (de-
scribing the ethnic Somali as being of taller stature with thinner bone structures
and coppery brown skin).




CITIZENSHIP, CIVIC VIRTUE, AND IMMIGRANT INTEGRATION
One Bantu with whom I spoke confirmed much of this behavior. He said
that ethnic Somali children had taught white children to use an expression
against Bantu children ("Ufl.") that indicated that the Bantu children smelled
bad. Apparently, Somali children may simply be mimicking their parents. This
Bantu, a Muslim, described how he was made to feel unwelcome whenever he
prayed at the local mosque and how on one occasion, he was told that he was
not welcome at a wedding. The day of the wedding, the Somali at the door, who
happened to be a government employee, told him that he could not enter be-
cause he was not dressed appropriately. The man then began to ask him what
soap and deodorant he was using. The Bantu eventually left.3 °9
Ethnic Somalis express annoyance and even outrage that Somali Bantus are
so outspoken about the persecution they faced in Somalia and the discrimina-
tion they continue to face in the United States. 1 It is striking that the Bantu,
enslaved and persecuted in Somalia, would choose to follow the ethnic Somalis
to Lewiston, almost as a reminder of this dark legacy. Somalia's history of tribal
conflict continues to haunt the Somalis in Lewiston, even as many strive to put
the past behind them.
Excluded from positions of leadership within the ethnic Somali commu-
nity, the Somali Bantus have chosen proudly to establish their separate identity
and support networks, underscoring the fact that, although they are Muslim,
they do not share the same culture, religious practices, social norms, or means
of livelihood as what they call the "regular" Somalis. They emphasize that their
women are not required to wear the hijab (even though many choose to do so),
proudly display the traditional dress of the Somali Bantu, and resist pressure by
the majority Somali culture and by Somali women's groups to conform. They
also are proud of the fact that there are women on the Board of Directors of the
Somali Bantu Mutual Assistance Association, and they hope one day soon to
have a woman as chair." They thus challenge the view of Islam that has been
presented by many Somali elders in Lewiston and the power structures that
have been created to accommodate the religious and cultural values of many
ethnic Somalis.
At the same time, the Somali Bantus in Lewiston face serious challenges.
Members of the Bantu community who came to the United States starting in
2003 are only now becoming eligible to apply for naturalization. They face for-
309. Interview with I.R., supra note 141.
310. Interview with A.Z., B.Y., and C.X., supra note 12 (describing conversation among
three women regarding the Bantu community's attitude towards ethnic Somalis).
C.X. explained discrimination against the low-caste Midgan clan as occurring be-
cause generations ago, a Midgan forefather ate a dead animal in the desert (con-
sidered haram in Islam) in order to survive, then refused to regurgitate it when he
reached safety. Id.
311. Interview with I.R., supra note 141; see also Somali Bantu Community Mutual
Assistance Association, http://web.archive.org/web/2oo7o8o3132541/sbcmaa.org/
contacts.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2009) (indicating the membership of women
on their board of directors).
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midable barriers. The greatest challenge is, without question, the high levels of
illiteracy in the Bantu community."2 Each weekday in Lewiston, dozens of So-
mali refugees gather at the Lewiston Adult Education Center. Most students
study English in formal classes, while preliterate students learn basic reading
and writing in more informal tutoring sessions. Most of these preliterate stu-
dents are Somali Bantus who never learned to read and write in Somalia.
1 3
Once they reach a certain level, they can be transferred into regular ESOL
classes 1 4 But, for many, English language proficiency is a distant goal, with the
most basic oral communication skills being the best for which most Somali
Bantus can hope. Inability to communicate in English is a major obstacle to
both entry into the workforce and eventual access to U.S. citizenship.
315
In addition to these obstacles, one additional problem looms on the hori-
zon for Bantus seeking naturalization. Although polygamy is legal in Somalia
and Kenya, polygamous unions are void as a matter of public policy under U.S.
law.316 Several persons reported that Somali men in polygynous unions who un-
derwent overseas refugee processing, particularly in the Bantu community, were
required by the U.S. government to divorce all their wives but one as a condi-
tion of admission. 17 Subsequent wives and their offspring were frequently ad-
mitted as refugees separately, however. Many of these family members ulti-
mately resettled in Lewiston, and in some circumstances, resumed their old
households.31s Yet even where Somali Bantu men have not resumed old house-
hold patterns, they may face legal responsibility for the financial support of
312. NADEAU, supra note 14, at 3.
313. Id. at 4. Somalia, which has a long oral tradition, did not adopt a written language
until 1972, during the Communist regime of Siad Barre. LEwis, supra note 147, at
216.
314. Interview with Anne Kemper, supra note 200.
315. See NADEAU, supra note 14, at 2; Interview with I.R., supra note 141 (describing
lack of literacy as major obstacle facing Bantu community); E-mail from Beth
Stickney, Executive Dir., Immigrant Legal Advocacy Project, to Lauren Gilbert,
Assoc. Professor of Law, St. Thomas Univ. (July 17, 2007, 4:55:24 EST) (on file
with the Yale Law & Policy Review) (describing lack of English capacity of most
participants at Naturalization Workshop in 2007); see also Rochvarg, supra note
133, at 416 (discussing important role community-based organizations play in
screening out persons who are not ready to naturalize because of their inability to
satisfy the English language requirement).
316. See, e.g., Matter of H-, 911. & N. Dec. 640, 641 (1962).
317. Interview with I.R., supra note 141; Interview with Patricia Buck, Assoc. Professor,
Bates Col., and Rachel Silver, in Portland, Me. (July 22, 2008) (on file with the
Yale Law & Policy Review). U.S. law only recognized the first wife as a derivative
spouse. See, e.g., Matter of Fong, 17 I. & N. Dec. 212, 213 (BIA 198o); Matter of
Man, 16 I. & N. Dec. 543, 544 (BIA 1978); Matter of H-, 9 I. & N. Dec. 640, 641-42
(BIA 1962).
318. Interview with I.R., supra note 141.
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their children in the event a paternity action or child support enforcement ac-
tion is brought and they are identified as the putative fathers.1 9 For many So-
mali Bantu men applying for naturalization, this creates a quandary. If they are
actively supporting their former families, they could be accused of practicing
polygamy; if they sever ties to these family members, they may be accused of
willfully failing or refusing to support dependents. Either way, they may be
found to lack the essential good moral character.
IV. CITIZENSHIP, CIVIC VIRTUE, AND COLLECTIVE IDENTITY
Interviews during the summer of 2008 with members of the Somali com-
munity uncovered competing perspectives on the value of becoming a U.S. citi-
zen. Older Somalis placed less importance on it or valued it largely for instru-
mental reasons, like obtaining a U.S. passport to travel back to Somalia or, for
the elderly, maintaining eligibility for public benefits."' Younger Somalis, par-
ticularly those who had spent most of their lives in the United States, were more
likely to see themselves as Americans and citizenship as the end of a process. 21
Yet, even young Somali-Americans, particularly members of the 1.5 generation,
who were born abroad but have lived most of their lives in the United States,322
still see themselves as Somalis first and Americans second. The importance of
their collective identity as Somalis is strongly ingrained within the community,
with one young Somali woman who wore full hijab describing the Somali
community in Lewiston as a single organism with "one brain."3 3 While some
young people describe the importance the Somalis place on their collective
identity as oppressive at times, many of the same young people describe it,
along with the important role played by social networks, as two of the major
benefits of being Somali.32 4 These norms are strongly inculcated within the
home and within the broader community.3 5
319. Under Maine law, the state may bring a child support enforcement action against
the non-custodial parent of a minor receiving public benefits, and where neces-
sary, take measures to establish paternity. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19-A,
§§ 1552-53 (1998).
320. Interview with D.W., supra note 50; Interview with G.T., supra note 50; Interview
with H.S., supra note 195.
321. Interview with D.W., supra note 50; Interview with A.Z., B.Y., and C.X., supra
note 12.
322. See Deborah Jean Opar, Race, Religion and Reception: Exploring Segmented As-
similation and the Somali "1.5" Generation, at 8 (Mar. 18, 2005) (unpublished B.A.
thesis, on file with Bates College Library).
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This Article has explored the interplay among competing community-
based norms at the national, local, and group level in terms of their influence
on an immigrant community's willingness or ability to integrate into a host
community's social fabric. It also has tested the utility of theories of national-
ism, liberalism, and multiculturalism in understanding the Somalis' experience
in Lewiston and making policy prescriptions. By studying the Somalis and host
community in Lewiston at close range, it also reaches some broader conclusions
regarding effective strategies for weaving newcomers with different religious
and cultural values into a community's social fabric. While the Somali experi-
ence in Lewiston is undoubtedly unique, their story has much in common with
the stories of refugees resettled in communities across the United States, as well
as with the experiences of other immigrant enclaves. Ultimately, I conclude that
a pluralist theory of integration based on tolerance, trust, and solidarity326 offers
far better prospects than a nationalist approach which sees immigrants who do
not share the national culture as a potentially destabilizing force327 or a multi-
cultural approach which would "affirm group difference at the expense of
commonality. ,,328 In the end, we live in a world of hyphenated identities,
but the key is that the latter term transcends ethnic differences. 9
Many Somalis who arrived in Lewiston between 2001 and 2003, when op-
position to their presence was at its zenith, have not, understandably, fully em-
braced local community values but have been more likely to seek sustenance
and support within their own networks.33 Indeed, over the last few years, and
particularly since Mayor Raymond's open letter, the mosque on Lisbon Street
has tended to insulate itself from the broader community, opening its doors
only to Muslims and educating young Somalis regarding their proper roles as
Muslim men and women.3 1 It would be disingenuous not to recognize that the
Somali community's tendency to self-segregate has resulted, at least in part,
from the fallout created by the Raymond letter. But there has also been some-
thing of a symbiotic relationship between the Somali elders and the elders of
Lewiston. Michael Walzer has argued that societal intolerance towards immi-
grant groups often can have group-sustaining effects. 32 The Somali elders may
have deftly used the Raymond letter and other isolated acts of hostility by
Lewiston residents to justify Somali separatism.
David Abraham raises concerns about what will happen if, as in the case of
post-Soviet Republics, "embedded sub-identities trump, overcome or eclipse
326. Abraham, supra note 37, at 150.
327. MILLER, supra note 22, at 126.
328. Id. at 140.
329. Id. at 136.
330. Interview with D.W., supra note 50.
331. See supra text accompanying notes 229-230.
332. WALZER, supra note 71, at 175-76.
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constitutionalized national citizen identities."333 Multicultural accommodation-
ists would recognize the right of each ethnic group to define its own identity
and formulate its own set of claims and demands. 334 But, while those committed
to a just society should unite to combat its injustices,35 social solidarity is ulti-
mately undermined if the deprived group rejects the identity of the larger
community in which it resides.136
There is much evidence of a strong liberal tradition in Lewiston. Notwith-
standing incidents of discrimination and hostility, the city government has
committed itself to meeting the Somalis' needs for food, shelter, housing, and
education, and has accommodated many of their religious differences. The
peace rally at Bates College in support of the Somalis attracted 4,500 partici-
pants from the surrounding area as well as the city's and state's major political
leaders. When Brent Matthews rolled a frozen pig's head into the local mosque,
Lewiston residents held a solidarity rally in support of the Somalis in the city's
Kennedy Park.337
Yet, as Patricia Buck, an education professor at Bates College in Lewiston,
Maine has observed, while preferable to nativism, liberal discourse also has its
limitations 3s1 Professor Buck describes how liberalism positions itself on a
"moral high ground."3 9 Liberalism characterizes the United States as a "nation
of immigrants," welcomes the newcomer and tolerates certain benign cultural
differences, but it does so with "an expectation that newcomers learn the domi-
nant language, work toward economic self-sufficiency, and integrate into the
socio-cultural fabric of the national community." 340 To the extent that new-
comers like the Somalis do not live up to these high expectations, there is the
danger that over time, the welcome mat extended will be withdrawn.
Although Motomura recommends extending the benefits of citizenship to
lawful permanent residents during the period preceding their eligibility for
naturalization, he also recommends withdrawing those benefits if immigrants
choose not to naturalize.341 Motomura's model of "immigration as transition"
would create powerful incentives for immigrants to transform themselves from
outsiders into citizens. This model would, however, penalize those who do not
333. Abraham, supra note 37, at 150.
334. MILLER, supra note 22, at 131.
335. Id. at 139.
336. Id. at 140.
337. Hench, supra note 185.
338. Patricia Buck, The US and Milltown: Traditionalism, Enlightenment, & Nativism, in
EDUCATED FOR CHANGE?, supra note 299, at 15.
339. Id.
340. Id.
341. MOTOMURA, supra note 232, at 13.
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choose or are not prepared to take the path to citizenship, and could result in
their further isolation within their communities.
Michael Walzer has also raised the concern that the more states open their
borders to immigrants and refugees, the more local communities will "build
petty fortresses" against immigrant influx.3 42 Indeed, we have seen this tendency
in the United States over the last several years, as local communities across the
country have enacted anti-immigrant ordinances.3 43 There is also a tendency,
however, for some immigrant groups to erect their own petty fortresses and to
create their own closed communities, particularly in situations where the values
of the host community are in tension with an immigrant or refugee group's
own religious or cultural values and where the group has encountered discrimi-
nation from the broader society.
The tendency within the Somali community to maintain their separateness
from the broader community and to value their collective identity as Somalis
over their identity as new Americans is likely to stand in the way, in the short
term, of their integration into Lewiston's social fabric and into the life of the na-
tion. Indeed, it appears that Somali elders may have capitalized on tensions with
the host community and among the various Somali clans and subclans to justify
Somali separatism. As long as Somalis remain divided along clan lines, the ar-
gument goes, the very conflicts that led to the destruction of the Somali state
will prevent them from unifying as one people. Thus, while the mosque is a
place where they can come together as one people, it has also become the Soma-
lis' own petty fortress. Just as the Prophet Mohammed condemned tribalism
while at the same time cleverly using it to bring the Muslim people together344
and Siad Barre, Somalia's last dictator, called for an end to clan rivalries while
ultimately maintaining himself in power by playing on such rivalries, 345 the So-
mali elders may be entrenching themselves in power by defining the Somalis in
opposition to the people of Lewiston.
It is important that Lewiston public officials, in a benign effort to
strengthen ties with the Somali leadership, not accommodate practices that
marginalize women or groups such as the Bantu. Indeed, the Somali experience
in Lewiston underscores the limits of a policy of multicultural accommodation.
Ayelet Shachar warns that a policy of accommodation, while protective of
group rights, risks infringing on the rights of women and cultural minorities .3 6
Shachar discusses the crucial role that women play in constructing a group's
collective identity vis-A-vis the wider society:
342. WALZER, supra note 234, at 39.
343. See Julia Preston, In Reversal, Courts Uphold Local Immigration Laws, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1o, 20o8, at A22.
344. See SALZMAN, supra note 279, at 137-38.
345. LEWIS, supra note 147, at 262-63.
346. SHACHAR, supra note lo, at 51.
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[I]dealized and gendered images of women as mothers, caregivers,
educators, and moral guardians of the home come to represent the ul-
timate and inviolable repository of "authentic" group identity.....
These images of "idealized womanhood" become cultural markers that
help erase internal diversity and disagreement, while concurrently al-
lowing both minority and majority leaders to politicize selective and
often invented boundaries between the "self' and the "other.
347
In Lewiston, the limit of group-based norms is well illustrated by the So-
mali community's response to the problem of domestic violence. Notwith-
standing the important role played by social networks in the Somali commu-
nity, they have not served as effective alternatives to state-sponsored
protections.3 4s Somali women who seek protection within their communities
are often scolded for not being better wives. Those who go to the police or to a
women's shelter face social ostracism by the community and may be forced to
begin new lives elsewhere.3 49 The Somali community's approach to domestic
violence as a private family matter suggests that in this area, group-based norms
are not deserving of deference, and that there is a need for a broader commu-
nity response.
As Somali elders attempt to keep certain challenges facing the Somali
community out of the public spotlight, Somali leaders and Lewiston officials
must distinguish between those problems that are distinctly Somali and require
a Somali solution, such as clan rivalries, and those issues, like domestic violence,
female genital mutilation,30 and discrimination against low caste and minority
clans, that may require a state or local response. One of the areas where city
administrators have confronted tensions among community norms at the na-
tional, local, and group level and developed a local response has been with re-
gard to religious accommodation in the public schools. The City of Lewiston
and its public school system have walked the fine line between the First
Amendment's free exercise clause and its establishment clause, making extraor-
dinary efforts in recent years to accommodate the religious and cultural differ-
ences of ethnic Somalis, including through formal and informal policies for
dress, prayer, and dietary restrictions.351' As noted, city administrators' consider-
able deference to the Somali elders in implementing the new policy raises sub-
stantial establishment clause concerns and may not have taken into sufficient
347. Shachar, supra note lo, at 51-52.
348. Interview with A.Z., B.Y., and C.X., supra note 12; Interview with Patricia Buck,
supra note 141; Interview with Heather Lindkvist, supra note 12.
349. Interview with Patricia Buck, supra note 141.
350. Although no reported cases of female genital mutilation (FGM) were found oc-
curring within the Somali community in Lewiston, FGM, which was regularly
practiced in Somalia and in the refugee camps in Kenya, is still practiced by So-
malis in the United States. See, e.g., SONG, supra note 62, at 166-68; see also Per-
sonal Statement of K.P. (Aug. 1, 2oo8) (on file with author).
351. See supra text accompanying notes 252-253.
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consideration the views of Somali Muslims embracing a less conservative view
of Islam. Nonetheless, it demonstrated the capacity of the Somalis to work with
government officials to achieve a solution to a divisive social issue.
In contrast, France has veered to the opposite extreme, prohibiting, in the
best-known example, "ostentatious religious symbols" in the public schools."2
The headscarf example, like the Council of State's decision denying citizenship
to Faiza Silmi, underscored the potential incompatibility in France between na-
tional community norms and group norms. Just as the French government's
decision to ban the headscarf in public schools effectively resulted in strict Mus-
lims pulling their daughters out of public schools,"3 the denial of French citi-
zenship to Faiza Silmi was likely to make her even more dependent on her male
relatives for protection. Ironically, Faiza Silmi's conformity to the cultural and
religious values of her family and her community was treated as evidence of her
failure to assimilate to "core" French values of gender equality. To qualify for
French citizenship, Ms. Silmi, who was eligible for citizenship through her
spouse, apparently would have had to place herself in the untenable and poten-
tially dangerous position of challenging gender roles within her family and her
community.
The French example should be understood as a cautionary tale by U.S.
policymakers at the national, state, and local levels. Today, nationalists in the
United States have once again questioned the concept that loyalty to the United
States is compatible with other ties of affection,5 4 with some political theorists
debating the compatibility of Islam with liberal democracy. 355 In France, offi-
352. See supra text accompanying notes 60-63; see also SONG, supra note 62, at 173-75.
353. See Patrick Weil, A Nation in Diversity: France, Muslims and the Headscarf (Mar.
25, 2004), http://www.opendemocracy.net/node/18ii/pdf (last visited Mar. 8,
2009).
354. SELECT COMM'N STAFF REPORT, supra note 43, at 123.
355. See SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING
OF WORLD ORDER 211-14 (2002). While the French government requires that an
applicant demonstrate "assimilation," U.S. law requires that an applicant show
that he or she is "a person of good moral character, attached to the principles of
the Constitution of the United States and well disposed to the good order and
happiness of the United States." INA § 316(a). In the past, concerns about an ap-
plicant's "attachment" to the U.S. Constitution were raised most frequently where
an applicant had been a member of the Communist Party or other totalitarian
group. See Fedorenko v. United States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981); Polites v. United
States, 364 U.S. 426, 434 (196o); Nowak v. United States, 356 U.S. 660, 665 (1958);
Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946); Schneiderman v. United States, 320
U.S. 118, 121 (1943). However, as Kevin Johnson points out, in the early twentieth
century, this provision in the U.S. Constitution was used to deny naturalization to
pacifists, United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644, 652-53 (1929), and, as late as
1979, to Jehovah's Witnesses because of their refusal to vote, participate in politics,
bear arms or serve on juries, In re Williams, 474 F. Supp. 384, 387 (D. Ariz. 1979).
See Kevin Johnson, The Antiterrorism Act and the Immigration Reform Act and
Ideological Regulation in the Immigration Laws: Important Lessons for Citizens and
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cials were troubled by the fact that Faiza Silmi indicated no interest in politics
or voting."6 The Council of State defined her belief system as "radical" because
she believed in a woman's submission to her husband and the Islamic principle
that women should not "draw men's gazes," values of modesty and a woman's
proper role within the family that were seen as Western values only a few gen-
erations ago and would be considered the epitome of good moral character
within her community.35
7
Like French citizenship norms, U.S. naturalization law, as applied, often
has reflected its own set of core values. There is a tension in the case law be-
tween those judges embracing a "core culture" model of citizenship rooted in
Christianity and English Common Law and those endorsing a more liberal view
of citizenship. Although early case law on good moral character defined com-
munity norms in terms of the values and practices of the host community and
the immigrant community, it gradually evolved to define community standards
in terms of state or local law, with a particular focus in the forties and fifties on
state sexual mores legislation. The progression of the good moral character case
law away from its emphasis in the 1940s and 1950SI 51 to a modern focus on con-
duct deemed harmful to the public3 9 is consistent with classic liberalism, which
limits the state's power over the individual to those situations where the indi-
vidual's conduct causes harm to the interests of others.3
6 °
As discussed above, the good moral character bars for practicing polyga-
mists and willful failure to support dependents loom as major obstacles for
some Somalis, particularly Somali Bantus. Although the obsession in naturali-
zation law with sexual mores appears to have dissipated since the Nemetz deci-
sion in 1981 and the removal of adultery as an automatic bar that same year,361
polygamy remains a taboo practice under the U.S. immigration laws. Such mar-
riages, even if valid where performed, are still considered void as a matter of
public policy and are seen as contrary to the laws of nature as recognized in
Christian countries.361 Polygamy thus continues to remain on the illicit side of
the divide between licit and illicit sex.
363
Noncitizens, 28 ST. MARY'S L.J. 833, 864-65 nn. 166-68; see also Neuman, supra note
80, at 253 n.43.
356. Bennhold, supra note 2.
357. Id.
358. See supra text accompanying notes 104-111.
359. See Nemetz v. INS, 647 F.2d 432, 437 (4 th Cir. 1981).
360. JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY AND OTHER EssAYs 14 (John Gray ed., Oxford
Univ. Press 20o8) (articulating the "harm principle," which contends that power
can only be exercised over a member of civilized society, against his will, to pre-
vent harm to others).
361. See supra text accompanying notes 131-141.
362. See, e.g., Matter of H-, 91 I. & N. Dec. 640, 641 (1962).
363. See Dubler, supra note 130, at 763-65.
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Polygamy, like the issue of female genital mutilation, presents a thorny is-
sue for the Somali community. The U.S. government knowingly admitted So-
mali refugees who had been practicing polygamists. To the extent that these
families reunite in the United States, they face renewed accusations of practicing
polygamy. Yet, as discussed above, failure to support dependents also consti-
tutes a discretionary bar to good moral character, putting non-custodial parents
in an untenable situation. One Somali Bantu pointed out the irony that U.S. so-
ciety tends to overlook adultery, particularly when it occurs clandestinely, but is
mortified by the idea of a man maintaining separate households. 36 4 Consistent
with liberal values, naturalization law should continue to move in the direction
of defining good moral character in terms of those practices that are harmful to
the public. To the extent that underage girls are forced into polygynous mar-
riage, it is cause for serious concern. To the extent that Somali men are attempt-
ing to fulfill their social obligations to their previous families, these continuing
ties should not serve as a basis for denying them citizenship.
The Naturalization Unit can use norms such as the English language and
good moral character requirements as tools for membership closure, applying
facially neutral rules as a means to exclude. Or it can see U.S. citizenship as a
tool for integrating immigrants into the life of a community and interpret citi-
zenship requirements generously to embrace eligible Somalis and other immi-
grants seeking full membership. In addition, a greater commitment should be
made at the national level to encourage immigrants and refugees living within
cultural enclaves to naturalize and to support local programs for their integra-
tion. This is particularly important in cases of secondary migration where refu-
gee groups resettled in urban areas have chosen, like the Somalis, to relocate to
communities without adequate infrastructure.
Although many Somalis in Lewiston still embrace a more instrumental ap-
proach to naturalizing consistent with Professor Neuman's unilateral liberal
model, 6 ' choosing to naturalize only when it is in their private self-interest, 6 6
other Somalis in Lewiston see U.S. citizenship as the key to full civic engage-
ment, whether through participation on the downtown neighborhood task
force, in city council meetings, or through volunteer work in public school.36 7
They are critical of fellow Somalis who choose not to participate in public af-
fairs unless they or their families are directly affected.36 Nonetheless, like Faiza
364. Interview with I.R., supra note 141.
365. Neuman, supra note 8o, at 238-39.
366. See Interview with D.W., supra note 5o; Interview with G.T., supra note 5o; Inter-
view with H.S., supra note 195. G.T. recounted how many Somalis naturalize in
order to obtain a U.S. passport to travel back to Somalia, while H.S., who provides
citizenship outreach services to the elderly, described how others, particularly the
elderly, do so to maintain their eligibility for public benefits.
367. See Interview with Ismail Ahmed, supra note 12; Interview with E.V., supra note
12.
368. See Interview with E.V., supra note 12.
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Silmi's decision to appeal her case to the French Council of State, it is arguable
that the Somalis' willingness to engage the public school system in a discussion
of what degree of religious accommodation was appropriate or permissible is
consistent with a model of citizenship that views civic engagement as a core
goal. Just as it is possible for Americans simultaneously to be members of their
local community, their religious community and the national community, and
for Somalis to be simultaneously Somalis, Muslims, and members of their par-
ticular clan, it should be possible for Somalis in Lewiston to rely on their strong
cultural and religious ties to their community while simultaneously seeking
membership within the broader community and, ultimately, U.S. citizenship.
Fortunately, the Somalis of Lewiston have several community leaders who have
been willing to challenge Somali elders to abandon isolationism and to work
towards a model of civic engagement in which Somalis are treated as and con-
sider themselves to be full members of the broader community.
CONCLUSION
Over seven years have passed since the first group of Somali refugees relo-
cated to Lewiston. It remains to be seen whether this social experiment in our
country's whitest state will succeed or whether the Somali elders will eventually
send scouts in search of a new home. For the time being, the voices of liberalism
in the local community have prevailed over the voices of nationalism and insu-
larity, and the Somali community has been embraced by citizens, government
leaders, and social service providers committed to ensuring their integration
into the social fabric. A growing number of Somalis have chosen the pathway to
U.S. citizenship, many for instrumental reasons, such as obtaining a U.S. pass-
port, while others have done so to participate fully in the life of the community.
Countless Somalis, particularly the elderly, women, and members of the Somali
Bantu community, face obstacles to citizenship, but social service providers
have demonstrated an expanded commitment over the last few years to assist
them through this process. Many educated members of the Somali community
embrace a definition of "acculturation" that enables them to choose which val-
ues of American culture to accept and which to reject, in a country in which it
still is possible to be both Somali and a U.S. citizen.
At the same time, government officials at both the national and local levels
must be aware of intragroup barriers to U.S. citizenship and integration and the
tendency within some immigrant and refugee communities to see U.S. citizen-
ship as a choice between assimilating to American values and maintaining their
cultural identity through religious and cultural separatism. They must be sensi-
tive to the public-private divide in U.S. law, respecting social networks as a
source of social solidarity but taking care not to endorse practices that violate
women's rights, like domestic violence, forced marriage, or female genital muti-
lation. Although multiculturalism is not necessarily inconsistent with modern
liberal perspectives on citizenship, in some cases multicultural accommodation
and nationalism, while described as polar opposites on the ideological spec-
trum, may in practice be mutually reinforcing. Either approach can impede ef-
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forts to integrate immigrants into the American mosaic, while permitting na-
tionalistic tendencies in both U.S. and immigrant cultures to thrive. To the ex-
tent that officials attempt to accommodate religious and cultural differences
without being sensitive to these tendencies, they run the risk of marginalizing
women and other groups living within ethnic enclaves.
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